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NO PLACE LIKE HOME: ASSAULTED MIGRANT
WOMEN'S CLAIMS TO REFUGEE STATUS AND
LANDINGS ON HUMANITARIAN AND
COMPASSIONATE GROUNDS
Felicite Stairs and Lori Pope*
INTRODUCTION 1
A significant portion of the immigration law work at Parkdale Community Legal Services involves assisting migrant women who have
been assaulted by their male partners, either here or in their home
country, or both. The stories usually fall into one of two groups, with
many variations in the individual facts.
In one group are women who have fled their home country because of
the violence of their husbands, and now seek asylum in Canada. Some
of these women have made refugee claims and are in various stages of
the backlog in the Canadian immigration process or in the new refugee determination system. Some have come as visitors, overstayed their
visas and are now without status. Sometimes, the abusive husband has
followed them to Canada.
The other group comprises women who have been sponsored by their
husbands while in Canada but are not yet permanent residents. If they
leave their husbands because of abuse, the sponsorship will usually be
withdrawn, and they face deportation.
*
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The Immigration Act (hereinafter the Act) and the Immigration Regulations (hereinafter the Regulations) and policies developed under it2 provide several potential avenues for admission of these women to
Canada as permanent residents: independent applicants, family sponsorship, Convention refugee claims, and humanitarian applicants.
However, all of them are fraught with difficulties flowing from the
objectives of the Act itself and the male bias inherent in the legislation.
The main objective of the Act is to "promote the domestic and international interests of Canada". Subsumed in this are the needs to promote a viable economy, to facilitate family reunification, and to fulfill
Canada's international obligations with respect to refugees and our
humanitarian tradition.3 All applicants must meet medical and criminal admissibility standards, and all except refugees, must show their
ability to be financially self-sufficient, so as not to be a burden on
Canada's social services. 4
The Act's other objective, "development of a strong and viable
economy", 5 is the basis of the selection criteria for investors, business
entrepreneurs and independent applicants. Members of these classes
are admitted to Canada because they bring in money, jobs or skills
deemed valuable to the Canadian labour force. Many of our clients
come from countries where education is not available to women, or
where it is not encouraged. Further, their job skills may be limited
because of actual and expected childcare responsibilities, or because
they have been confined in low-paying, low-skill jobs that women traditionally fill. This route to admission is therefore of limited value to
most of our clients. It is relevant here only insofar as it locates the dis2. ImmigrationAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, as amended (hereinafter the Act); Immigration
Regulations 1978, SOR/78-172 (hereinafter the Regulations); Immigration Manuals
(Ottawa: Employment and Immigration Canada). The manuals have 3 components: Legislation, Selection & Control, Examination & Enforcement (hereinafter1 I,
E respectively).
3. Immigration Act, ibid. at s. 3. The Act also requires that applications for permanent resident status must be made abroad (s. 9(l)). This can be circumvented on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, and is discussed
later in the paper.
4. These standards may be waived under exceptional circumstances on humanitarian grounds, but the ability to be self-supporting is a factor considered in
assessing an application on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, discussed more fully later in the paper.
5. Supra, note 2, s. 3(h).
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cussion of assaulted migrant women in the larger framework of
Canada's immigration policy in general.
The objective of family reunification is implemented primarily
through sponsorship of family class applicants, wherein a Canadian
resident or citizen may sign an undertaking of assistance, or sponsorship agreement, agreeing to assume financial responsibility for an
applicant who is a close family member.6 Women fleeing abusive husbands in their home country unsually don't have close relatives in
Canada who are willing and able to sponsor them under this program.
In some cases women who are escaping abusive sponsoring husbands
may be able to have another relative assume the sponsorship agreement, but generally they too cannot avail themselves of this program.
Refugees may be admitted if they can prove that their situations fit the
definition of Convention refugee under the Act. They must show a
well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, nationality, religion, political opinion or membership in a social group, and that they
are unable
or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of the
7
State.
However, the Convention refugee definition itself has been called discriminatory against women, 8 in that it recognizes persecution based
only on the publicly apparent enumerated grounds listed above, which
often do not reflect the private reality of women's lives. It also requires
a state connection to the persecution feared by the refugee claimant.
Women who are abused in their homes, especially those who have not
sought police protection because of shame or because they did not
believe protection would be forthcoming, may have difficulty showing
that what they have suffered is persecution, that it was because of one
of the enumerated grounds, and that the state was sufficiently con-

6. Only spouses and dependent children are eligible to be sponsored without the
sponsor meeting a means test. Unmarried children and parents may be sponsored upon proof of financial ability by the sponsor or sponsors. Family members who are not as close in relationship as family class members may sign an
undertaking of assistance for a relative who has applied as an independent
immigrant, increasing the applicant's chance of acceptance.
7. Supra, note 2, s. 2. This definition is treated in detail later in the paper.
8. D. Indra, "Gender: A Key Dimension of the Refugee Experience" (1987) 6:3
Refuge 3.
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nected to the persecution to bring the case under the definition of refugee in the Act.
The final route available under the Act is landing on humanitarian
grounds. There is no statutory definition of "humanitarian". The
authority to grant someone permanent resident status on these
grounds lies with the Minister of Employment and Immigration. It is a
discretionary power, with decisions made on a case by case basis.
However, there are guidelines contained in the policy manuals and
operations memoranda issued by the Minister. In general, permanent
resident status may be granted on humanitarian and compassionate
grounds if the applicant can show undeserved or disproportionate
hardship if returned home, as well as the ability to be financially selfsufficient if permitted to remain in Canada. This route is thus potentially open both to women whose sponsorship has been withdrawn
and to women who have fled their home country because of abuse.
Although this may be an easier route to admission than a refugee
claim, ignorance about wife assault and its almost universal occurrence may make it difficult to show that the hardship a woman faces
on return is sufficient to justify landing, or that allowing her to remain
in Canada will ameliorate her situation.

OBJECTIVES
The objective of this paper is to consider how, as advocates, we can
fruitfully advance refugee claims and humanitarian applications on
behalf of assaulted migrant women. 9 We start from the perspective
that the Act and policies reflect a view of the world which does not
take women's experiences of that world into account and thus disadvantages women. We have attempted, therefore, to show how the Act
and policies can be interpreted so as to redress that lacuna.
In the first section we discuss the issue of wife assault itself, to provide
background for the later, more legalistic sections and to provide the
reader with sufficient knowledge and sources to be able to frame their
9. The pangeographic and private nature of wife assault have led to the propositions that either there is no solution, or the solution lies in the international
dismantling of patriarchy. In this paper, we take the position that providing
international protection to battered women does not conflict with an ultimate
goal of dismantling patriarchy. Further, in our casework we work with real
women who are individually in danger and need what assistance we can provide them now.

(1990) 6 Journal of Law and Social Policy

own clients' cases. We follow that with an examination of the definition of Convention refugee, in particular as it applies to the situation
of assaulted migrant women. We discuss not only how, why and when
refugee claims may and should work for assaulted migrant women:
but, also examine the points of resistance we have encountered to considering wife assault victims as subjects for international protection
under the Convention refugee definition. The third section treats
applications for landing on humanitarian and compassionate grounds,
both for women in the refugee stream and those whose sponsorship
has been withdrawn following separation because of abuse. In the
final section, we outline some of the non-legal as well as legal strategies being developed by the staff at Parkdale Community Legal Services to assist assaulted migrant women.
We see this paper as a first step, flowing from the perceived needs and
possibilities we have encountered in our own work. It also stems from
the knowledge that the current awareness of wife assault as a social
problem, with social and political solutions, is very recent even in
Canada. In 1982, it was still possible for Canada's political leaders to
greet the issue with laughter in the House of Commons. 10 Yet less
than a decade later, Madame Justice Wilson delivered a landmark
decision on battered wives in . v. Lavalleg1 1 in which she recognized
both the gravity of the problem and the role of ideology in its perpetuation. In that decision, she challenged the notion that we as individual
members of society are knowledgeable about the experience of battered wives; "common knowledge" about wife assault may in fact be
built on myths and stereotypes. The decision in Lavallee urges a
rethinking and challenging of conventional wisdom about the nature
of violence against women. This paper forms part of the challenge to
the way conventional wisdom informs current theory and practice in
immigration law.

10. L. MacLeod, Battered but not Beaten... (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on
Women, 1987) at 3.
11. (1990) 108 N.R. 321 (S.C.C.).

Assaulted Migrant Women's Claims to Refugee Status

WIFE ASSAULT
We use 'wife assault' or 'wife battering' 12 in this paper to mean physical and sexual abuse by an intimate partner, whether the couple are or
were legally married, living together, or dating. Occasionally, the intimacy is defined by his obsession with her-. they may or may not have
ever had a 'relationship',
but he has fixated on her as the main target
13
for his violence.
We chose these over other terms such as 'spousal assault' and 'domestic violence' because they clearly import the notion that it is women
who are being beaten by men. Although women are occasionally vio14
lent towards men, the incidence outside of self-defence is very small.
Wife assault also has a different cultural meaning and different consequences than husband abuse, as men continue to hold power in society and in families, 15
and as they are usually physically bigger and
stronger than women.
We use the term 'assault' to mean any act which constitutes a threat to
the woman's physical integrity. It thus encompasses not only assaults
with fists, choking and unwanted sexual acts, but also assaults with
weapons, including but not limited to knives, irons, cigarettes, lit can12. For one of us, 'assault' was more evocative of the horror of the stories we have
heard; for the other, 'battering' was. In the end, we decided we both used them
to mean the same thing, and so they appear interchangeably in the text.
13. Noble v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (hereinafter Noble) (Immigration Appeal Board Decision T86-10176, C.L.I.C. No. 108.16, 10 June 1987)
fits this category: although they had never had an intimate relationship, Ms.
Noble was pursued by her assailant over many years, for no apparent reason. Aside from the lack of intimate relationship, the facts with respect to
the assailant hunting her down are similar to wife assault cases.
14. D.E.H. Russell, Rape In Marriage (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1990 ed.) c. 8; D.G. Saunders, "Wife Abuse, Husband Abuse or Mutual Combat?" in K. Yllo & M. Bograd, eds., Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1988) 90; M. Wilson & M. Daly, Spousal
Homicide in Canada (Department of Psychology, McMaster University,
1987) [unpublished].
15. MacLeod, supra, note 10 at 17-18.
A recent Hamilton, Ontario case reported that an "abused husband" who
strangled his wife in a "domestic dispute" was given a two-year sentence
for manslaughter. "He said he was trying to fend off a knife attack from
his wife when he strangled her to death with one hand...". K. Marron,
The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (8 August 1990) A7.
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dles, saws and guns, as well as bottles and metal rods forced up the
vagina. It also includes forcible confinement, and threats with weapons (knives thrown at the woman, guns aimed at her). Although much
of the abuse we have heard about is confined to a series of single violent incidents, in some cases the woman has been tortured 16 over a
period of hours or days, often with a variety of methods used in a single incident.
'Wife abuse' is a broader term than 'wife assault'. It includes not only
physical and sexual abuse, but also emotional abuse (verbal denigration and humiliation), psychological abuse (acts of terrorism such as
threats, destruction of pets and property) and economic abuse (withholding of economic resources resulting in the woman being virtually
penniless regardless of the husband's assets or income). Although
women report that these forms of abuse are often more damaging and
long-lasting than physical attacks, 17 we concentrate in this paper on
physical abuse because it is easier to prove and easier to see as life
threatening in an immediate sense.
Obtaining accurate figures on the occurrence of wife assault is
extremely difficult. In a 1980 study, it was estimated that one in ten
women in Canada was battered by her husband. 18 A more recent
study of Metropolitan Toronto suggests that the figure is actually
closer to one in four. 19 Further, almost half of all wife assault incidents result in physical injuries.20 Spousal homicide figures show that
wives were 3.3 times as likely to be killed by their husbands as hus-

16. The similarities in the effects of wife abuse and torture are more fully developed
infra in the section on "Wife assault as a form of persecution".
17. MacLeod, supra, note 10 at 11-15.
18. L. MacLeod with A. Cadieux, Wife Battering in Canada: the Vicious Circle
(Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1980) at 21.
19. M. Smith, "The Incidence and Prevalence of Woman Abuse in Toronto",
(1987) 2 Violence and Victims in M. Randall, "The Politics of Woman
Abuse: Understanding the Issues" (Nov. 1989) Education Wife Assault at 1.
20. P. Jenson, Spousal Abuse in Metropolitan Toronto: Research Report on the
Response of the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Metro Toronto Advisory
Committee on Spousal Abuse, 1989) at 39, cited in "Wife Assault: The
Health Issues", Fact Sheet (Toronto: Ontario Women's Directorate).

Assaulted Migrant Women's Claims to Refugee Status

bands were by their wives,21 and that wives accounted for 62% of all
female homicide victims.22
Wife assault cuts across class, race, ethnic and religious lines.23
Although some researchers have found a correlation between poverty
and wife assault,24 it may be that women with fewer resources more
where they will more
frequently seek the help of public agencies
25
readily come to the attention of researchers.
Figures on wife assault in the international context are very difficult to
obtain. Even when figures are presented, they are often hard to interpret, as research methods and even definitions of wife abuse may
vary.26 However, researchers appear to agree that wives are the most
common victims of spousal assault in all countries investigated to
date.27 For the purposes of this paper, the incidence rate in individual
of the near
countries is probably less important than an understanding
28
universality of the phenomenon of wife assault
21. Wilson & Daly, supra, note 14 at 1.
22. Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide in Canada 1987: A Statistical Perspective
(Ottawa: 1988) at 59, cited in "Wife Assault: The Health Issues", supra, note
20.
23. B.M. Pressman, Family Violence: Origins and Treatment (Guelph: Children's
Aid Society of the City of Guelph and the County of Wellington, 1984) at
11-15; Del Martin, Battered Wives (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1976) at
54ff; Randall, supra, note 19 at 1.
24. D. Finkelhor, R. Gelles, G. Hotaling, et al., eds., The Dark Side of Families
(Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1983) at 20-21.
25. Martin, supra, note 23 at 55.
26. RJ. Gelles & C.P. Cornell, International Perspectives on Family Violence
(Toronto: D.C. Heath Co., 1983) at 4-5.
27. Ibid. at 16.
28. A recent review of the literature and list of sources is available in T.
Schweitzer, "Women and International Protection: A Guide to the
Literature" (Parkdale Community Legal Services Intensive Programme in
Poverty Law; April, 1990) [unpublished]. Other sources include M. Davies,
ed., Third World-Second Sex, vol. II (London: Zed Press, 1987); Gelles &
Cornell, supra note 26; L. Heise, "Crimes of Gender" (1989) 2:2 Worldwatch
12 and "The global war against women" (Nov.-Dec. 1989) Utne Reader 40;
D.E.H. Russell & N. Van de Ven, Crimes Against Women (East Palo Alto,
CA: Frog in the Well, 1976).
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Much has been written in the last two decades on the sociology and
psychology of wife assault in the North American and British contexts.29 Recently, as counselling programs with batterers develop, the
question of why men batter is also being addressed. 30 The following
thumbnail sketch concentrates only on the aspects of wife assault
which are necessary to understand to advocate effectively for assaulted
women, and does not pretend to cover all the issues. Further, it must
be remembered that 'wife assault' is not a single phenomenon or experience: the form it takes is often culturally specific,31 and the experi32
ence of it is influenced by age, race, religion and ethnic origin.
There are many myths surrounding wife assault. The first one is that
women enjoy the battering; otherwise they wouldn't stay. Walker has
used the term 'cycle of violence' to describe the normal progression of
wife assault.33 The first stage in the cycle is a buildup of tension, followed by the assaultive incident and then by the 'honeymoon phase'.
During the honeymoon phase, the partner is remorseful, often showers
her with gifts and loving attention and promises to never do it again.
29. See, for example, L. Freedman, "Wife Assault" in C. Guberman & M. Wolfe,
eds., No Safe Place (Toronto: Women's Press, 1985) 41; Finkelhor, supra note 24;
R. Gelles, Family Violence (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1987); Martin,
supra note 23; MacLeod, supra notes 10 and 18; Pressman, supra note 23; Randall, supra note 19; Russell, supra note 14; D. Sinclair, Understanding Wife
Assault: A TrainingManual for Counsellors and Advocates (Toronto: Ministry of
Community and Social Services, Family Violence Program, 1985); L.E. Walker,
The Battered Woman (New York: Harper & Row, 1979); Yllo & Bograd, eds.,
supra note 14.
30. For example, D.HJ. Morgan, "Masculinity and Violence" in . Hanmer &
M. Maynard, eds., Women Violence and Social Control (Atlantic Highlands,
NJ: Humanities Press International, 1987) 180; J. Ptacek, "Why Do Men Batter Their Wives?" in Yllo & Bograd, eds., supra, note 14 at 133.
31. "Bride-burning" in India exemplifies this: see Heise, supra note 28 at 14-15;
and G. Kelkar, "Violence Against Women: An Understanding of Responsibility for their Lives" in Davies, ed., supra note 28 at 181. The universality of
hands and weapons produces many commonalities, but also see Martin,
supra note 23 at 53-54, regarding military or ex-military men as batterers in
the United States.
32. Randall, supra, note 19 at 4.
33. Walker, supra, note 29, c. 3. She also lists and rebuts many other myths surrounding wife assault in Chapter 1. Wilson J.cited Walker's theory on the
cycle of violence in Lavallee, supra, note 11, as well as discussing other
myths.
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If there is anything in this pattern which women like, it is this latter
phase. There
is no support for the theory that women enjoy the vio34
lence itself.
Although abusive behaviour is sometimes apparent before the couple
begins cohabiting, it more often begins later in the relationship. Pregnancy is a frequent trigger for violence,35 as is marriage itself.36 The
behaviour usually starts with threats or mild assaults,
but then esca37
lates in severity and frequency of violence over time.
Women stay or return for a variety of reasons. One is a belief that
their partner really can change, or that he is in trouble and needs her.
Another is a belief that the success of the relationship is the woman's
responsibility; if it fails it is her fault and her shame. Although these
feelings appear to occur across cultures, the importance of them varies
among cultures. Another reason is a very real lack of options: women
with few skills, limited availability of day care and affordable housing
and children to house and feed may find
the possibility of escape and
38
making it on their own unimaginable.
The battering itself may contribute to limiting a woman's perceived
options. A common feature of abusive relationships is progressive isolation. Abusive men are often very dependent on their wives, and jealous of any outside relationships they may have.39 The abusive
husband may create a scene when his wife sees other people to the

34. Abused women have recently been compared to hostages held by terrorists,
however, with the concomitant identification with and even love for the hostage
taker seen in other hostages. See D.L.R. Graham, E.Rawlings & N. Rimini,
"Survivors of Terror:. Battered Women, Hostages and the Stockholm Syndrome"
in Yllo & Bograd, supra, note 14 at 217.
35. Forty percent of wife assault incidents begin during pregnancy: Education
Wife Assault, Fact Sheet on Wife Assault in Canada (Toronto, 1985). See also
Gelles, supra, note 29, c. 7; MacLeod, supra, note 18 at 11.
36. Several of our clients reported violence within the week after marriage, usually accompanied with demands and statements like "now you're my wife
you have to do what I say".
37. Sinclair, supra, note 29 at 19; Walker, supra, note 29 at 30.
38. Freedman, supra, note 29 at 53-55; Gelles, supra, note 29, c. 6; Martin, supra,
note 23, c. 5; MacLeod, supra, note 18, c. 5; Pressman, supra, note 23, c. 2.
39. Freedman, ibid. at 47; Pressman, ibid. at 17-18; Randall supra, note 19 at 3.
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point where she feels it is not worth trying to maintain these relationships. He may also abuse her close friends and family so that they will
no longer see her. When a woman in this situation tries to escape, she
may have few supports to help her do so.
Living in constant fear produces a sense of powerlessness in many
women, a sense that they cannot control their lives sufficiently to escape.
Concomitantly, the abuser is perceived as so powerful that she cannot
ever hope to get away.40 The latter perception is grounded in reality: 44%
of women in a shelter reported violence after separation from their husbands.4 1 And 23% of women killed by their legal husbands in 1985 were
separated at the time.4 2 Constant verbal degradation contributes to the
feeling that she is worthless and cannot survive on her own.
No discussion of wife assault is complete without at least a reference
to the difficulties women have in obtaining police protection and justice in the court system. After years of activism on this issue, the situation in Canada has improved. However, there are still police officers
who refuse to lay charges or enforce peace bonds, restraining orders or
probation orders, and still judges who trivialize wife assault. Even
when the police and court system cooperate to punish the offender,
there are still situations where only a 24-hour bodyguard would provide adequate protection. Many women know this, and the ineffectiveness of police protection and fear of further reprisals from the
assailant combine to inhibit police contact. The police are generally
used as a last resort. 43
Immigrant women in Canada face special barriers in wife assault situations, as well as the ones shared with Canadian-born women. Cultural values may exacerbate feelings of responsibility and shame for
breaking up the family. Lack of language skills often limit their knowledge of laws which could protect them.44 Wife assault is not a crime
everywhere, and they may not be aware that it is a crime in Canada.
40. Walker, supra, note 29, c. 2; Graham & Rawlings, supra, note 34 at 222-225.
41. MacLeod, supra note 10 at 20.
42. Wilson & Daly, supra, note 14 at 3.
43. Gelles, supra, note 29 at 112. Women are beaten 35 times on average before

they call the police: Sinclair, supra, note 29 at 19.
44. ARA Consultants, Wife Battering Among Rural, Native and Immigrant Women

(March, 1985, located at Ontario Women's Directorate) at 13; MacLeod,
supra, note 10 at 26.

Assaulted Migrant Women's Claims to Refugee Status
If their husband knows English and they do not, then their power
base within the family may be even further eroded. Calling crisis telephone lines, or the police, may be impossible because of language
skills. Many non-English-speaking women report calling the police
only to have the police take the 'story' from the husband, or use the
45
children as interpreters. Few charges are laid under these conditions.
Calling the police itself may not be feasible for some women because of
their cultural background. If they come from a country with a repressive
regime, they may be extremely reluctant to call uniformed male authority
figures to help them with their problem.46 Their husbands may have
threatened to call Immigration and have them deported if they call the
police. Alternatively, they may be afraid their husband will be deported.
They usually only want to stop the beating, not have him thrown in jail
and deported,4 7 especially if he is a refugee himself.
There is also sometimes a sense of betraying the community. Many
women who do not self-identify with the dominant culture or feminism may see calling the police or going to a shelter as a betrayal of
their community through exposing their men to white Anglo authority
and exacerbating the stereotype of violence in their community.48 This
may be reinforced by the community itself, and the woman in so
doing may find herself ostracized. 49
Threats of deportation are a form of wife abuse common to immigrant
women, whether or not they are permanent residents. Believing their
husband to be all-powerful, they often believe he has the power to
have them deported. At the least, deportation means uprooting from
her community here and a reduced standard of living; it may also
mean being sent back to the home country to face shame and ostra45. ARA Consultants, ibid. at 6-8.
46. ARA Consultants, ibid. at 9; MacLeod, supra, note 10 at 26.
47. ARA Consultants, ibid. at 10.
48. For the way in which this also functions in Third World countries, see M.
Helie-Lucas, "Bound and Gagged by the Family Code" in Davies, ed., supra,
note 28 at 13-14.
49. One woman was badly abused for over twenty years. She never called the
police. Finally, in self-defence, she threw an object at. her husband, who
called the police and had them charge her with assault with a weapon. She
was made to do penance by her community for bringing shame on them all.
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cism, and separation from her children. The fear of deportation is not
always unrealistic, as discussed below.

APPUCATION OF THE CHARTER
It is clear that the Immigration Act must be interpreted in a manner
consistent with the guarantees of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (hereinafter the Charter).50 Paragraph 3(f) of the Act provides
that Canadian immigration policy, rules and regulations are to be
designed and administered in a way that ensures that standards of
admission to Canada do not discriminate in a manner inconsistent
with the Charter. In any case, as a piece of federal legislation, the
Immigration Act must conform to the equality guarantees in section 15
of the Charter.5 1
In Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia52 the Supreme Court of
Canada stated:
"Recognizing that there will always be an infinite variety of personal characteristics, capacities, entitlements and merits among
those subject to a law, there must be accorded, as nearly as may be
possible, an equality of benefit and protection and no more of the
restrictions,
53 penalties or burdens imposed upon one than
another."

The Court went on to define discrimination as:
"A distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds
relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group,

which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or
which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and
advantages available to other members of society."54

50. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), 1982 c. 11 (hereinafter the Charter).
51. "No problem regarding the scope of the word 'law', as employed in s. 15(l),
can arise in this case because it is an Act of the Legislature which is under
attack." Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [19891 1 S.C.R. 143 at 164
per McIntyre J.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid. at 164.
54. Ibid. at 174.
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The definition of refugee in the Act must be interpreted and applied in
a way that recognizes the reality of women's lives.55 Similarly, policies
for the admission of persons based on humanitarian and compassionate grounds must be administered in a way that takes into account
experiences of women that do not have a parallel in men's experience.
To do otherwise would produce a disparate impact on women, by
denying many women the benefit of international protection.

DEFINITION OF CONVENTION REFUGEE
The definition of refugee in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees 56 was developed to deal with those people displaced as a
result of the Second World War, in particular survivors of the Holocaust and displaced persons. The 1967 Protocol relating to the Status
of Refugees5 7 extended the protection of the Convention to persons
who had become refugees after the adoption of the Convention.
Although the time restriction in the Convention was thus formally
abolished for signatories of the Protocol, the wording of the actual definition was not altered. In order to be recognized as a refugee, a person is still required to establish that:
"Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, [she or he] is outside the country of [her or]
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail [herself or] himself of the protection of that country... 58
The Convention does not specifically protect persons persecuted
because of their sex.

55. The Supreme Court of Canada took this approach in Brooks v. Canada Safeway
Ltd. (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.) and Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd.
(1989), 59 D.L.R. 352 (S.C.C.) when it decided that discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy and sexual harassment were forms of sex discrimination because
only women can become pregnant (Brooks) and it is predominantly women who
face sexual harassment at work (Janzen).
56. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 189 at 137.
57. Ibid. vol. 606 at 267.
58. Supra, note 56, Article I (A)(2).
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WOMEN AS REFUGEES
Today, as noted by the Executive Committee of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, the majority of the world's refugees
are women and girls. 59 Despite this fact, most refugee claimants are
men. Responsibility for the day to day care of children, lack of financial resources, cultural and other restrictions make it difficult for a
woman to travel to a potential country of resettlement such as Canada
to make a claim for refugee status. Instead, refugee women are much
more likely to migrate with other members of their community to refugee camps from which, if they are among the relative few to meet the
6°
selection criteria, they may be resettled in countries such as Canada.
Because some women are deprived of the protection of their state for
the reasons recognized in the definition, and because not all men are
protected by the Convention, 6 1 the definition of refugee may appear to
be gender-neutral. Anyone persecuted for one of the Convention reasons is eligible for international protection. The position of women
throughout most of the world, however, is such that they are much less
likely to be involved in politics (as it has been traditionally defined) or
the publicly active religious, racial, nationalistic or social groups
62
whose persecution or lack of state protection are well-known.

59. Executive Committee Conclusion No. 39 (XXXVI) Refugee Women and International Protection, 1985 (Executive Committee-36th Session), paragraph (c).
60. Because of resettlement policies which emphasize self-sufficiency over need
for protection and selection criteria based on the refugee's employment history and education, which discriminate against most women, women in refugee camps are generally less likely to be selected for resettlement than men.
See N. Kelly, Working with Refugee Women: A Practical Guide (Geneva:1989)
at 17.
61. The geographical bias of the Convention is evident in its failure to protect
men or women who flee their countries because of "events seriously disturbing public order", a provision of the Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa adopted by the Organization of African Unity on 10 September 1969.
62. See Indra, supra, note 8, for a discussion of the Convention definition's
emphasis on "public sphere" activities and the implications for women refugee claimants.
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In Canada, the great majority of refugee claimants are single men or
men with families. 63 The interpretation of the Convention definition
has therefore created a body of caselaw based on the experiences of
claimants who are, for the most part, male. Decision-makers have not
often been called upon to consider issues such as female-specific definitions of 'social group' and 'political opinion', forms of persecution
directed at women, and what effective state protection for women
means in practice.
Unfortunately for many women, the Convention does not obviously
protect them from persecution. International protection may not
readily be available to women unless the circumstances prompting
them to leave their country of origin are the same as or analogous to
the reasons that men flee. One way to deal with this problem of the
disparate impact of the refugee definition is to interpret the definition
in a way that recognizes that women's resistance does not always manifest itself in the same way as men's resistance. What appears to be
non-political activity by women may, on more careful inspection, turn
out to be a form of political protest or organization. As Jacqueline
Greatbatch has noted,64 the refusal of some Iranian women to adopt
the chador is an expression of opposition to the Islamic fundamental-

63. Interview with Michael Schelew, President of Amnesty International-Canadian
Section, transcribed in S. Arend, "Deux Entrevues" (1989) 10:1 Canadian
Women's Studies/les cahiers de la femme 91
The breakdown by sex of the decisions of the Immigration Appeal Board and
Immigration and Refugee Board on file at the Refugee Law Research Unit,
Toronto, Ontario, as of August 9, 1990 reflects the imbalance in numbers of
male and female claimants to which Mr. Schelew referred: 470 female claimants and 2758 male claimants. A number of the women claimants will have
based their claim entirely on their husband's claim. While not all claimants will

receive a written decision (since written decisions are only required for negative
determinations), the difference is nonetheless so extreme that the imbalance
remains clear.
64. "The Gender Difference: Feminist Critiques of Refugee Discourse" (1989) 1
IntJ.Ref.L. 518.
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ist state. 65 Similarly, the search for missing relatives, the communal
kitchens and co-operative nurseries organized by Chilean women in
the 1970s and 1980s were a form of resistance against the Pinochet
regime in Chile. 66 Thus, where an ostensibly non-political act such as
choice of dress is seen to in fact be political in nature, it may provide
the basis for a claim to refugee status.
However, this analysis is not sufficient to counteract all the gender
bias in refugee determination. The decision-maker may fail to recognize the political nature of the claimant's activity or affiliation or it
may simply be that no analogy to the types of activities and affiliations traditionally recognized as falling within the Convention defimition exists. For example, the Immigration and Refugee Board has
refused to recognize as a refugee a Chinese woman who had been
forced by the authorities to have two abortions, one late in the pregnancy. 67 The Board did not consider whether or not the claimant's
actions were an expression of a religious or political opinion nor
whether or not unwanted third-trimester abortions were a form of persecution. A more thoughtful panel may have found an analogy
between this claimant's experience and that of a conscientious objector
who refuses to serve in the military and as a result suffers dis-

65. ]bid at 520-521. An Iranian woman whose claim was in part based on her opposition to her country's dress code for women was recently refused by the Immigration Appeal Board. The Minister of Employment and Immigration
subsequently exercised her discretion to allow the woman to remain in Canada.
The Iranian embassy had refused to issue the woman with travel documents
because she had not worn the chador for the photographs she had submitted to
the embassy. C. Montgomery, "Iranian woman allowed to stay" The lrorontol
Globe and Mail (IAugust 1990). It is worth noting that the U.N.H.C.R. Handbook characterizes a refusal to provide travel documents as a refusal of protection. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Handbook on Proceduresand Criteriafor DeterminingRefugee Status under the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the status of Refugees (Geneva: 1979)
at paragraph 99 (hereinafter the Handbook).
66. Ibid. at 522-523.
67. Immigration and Refugee Board Decision T89-00882, June 1989. Because of
the claimant's confusion over the dates of the abortions, the Board appears
not to have believed that they did, in fact, occur. Rather than attributing the
difficulty with dates to the stress of the forced abortions, the Board chose
not to pursue the issue of imposed medical procedures as a form of persecution.
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proportionately severe punishment 68 In the case of women who experience violence from their partners, there is no realistic analogy to
male experience. The nature, effects and documentation of continuing
violence at the hands of a husband or boyfriend from which a woman
cannot expect the protection of the state are fundamentally different
from the kinds of persecution faced by men. The differences are manifested in ways that make it difficult for women to establish their claim
to refugee status because the image of what constitutes a refugee has
been shaped to such an extent by male experience.
The challenge for those who work on behalf of battered migrant
women is to find a way to make the Convention fit these women's circumstances in order for them to receive the international protection
they require. The Convention definition has been directly incorporated
into Canadian law.69 While the history of the Convention and its
application in other countries will have an impact on its interpretation
by Canadian courts and tribunals, Canadian decision-makers must
also interpret the Convention in a manner that is consistent with the
Charter. Decision-makers can provide international protection in a
non-discriminatory way by interpreting the terms "social group", "wella way that
founded fear of persecution" and state "protection" in
70
accommodates the differences between men and women.
MEMBERSHIP IN A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
The U.N.H.C.R. Handbook describes a "particular social group" as a
group normally comprised of "persons of similar background, habits
or social status".7 1 Atle Grahl-Madsen describes this category as one
which, like race, is "beyond the control of the individual". 72 The
caselaw regarding "social group" has defined the term more broadly

68. See paragraphs 169-173 of the U.N.H.C.R. Handbook, supra, note 65, regarding
the circumstances in which the refusal to perform military service may form the
basis of a claim to refugee status.
69. Act, supra, note 2, s. 2(1).
70. "(Tjhe accommodation of differences... is the essence of true equality..."
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia supra, note 51 at 169 per McIntyre J.
71. Supra, note 65 at paragraph 77.
72. The Status of the Refugee in InternationalLaw, vol. 1 (Netherlands: SijthoffLeyden, 1966) 217.
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than Grahl-Madsen to include associations of a voluntary nature,7 3
thus taking a more comprehensive approach such as the one advocated by Guy Goodwin-Gill:
"In determining whether a particular group of people constitutes a
'social group' within the meaning of the Convention, attention
should... be given to the presence of unifying factors such as ethnic, cultural, and linguistic origin; education; family background;
economic activity; shared values, outlook, and aspirations. Also relevant are the attitude to the putative social group of other groups in the
same society and, in particular,the treatment accorded to it by state
authorities."74 [emphasis added.]

Women constitute a social group both because they share certain
'immutable' characteristics and because they are frequently treated differently from men. To a greater extent than most social groups, women
are an easily identifiable 'group'. As recognized by the Supreme Court
of Canada in R v. Lavallee, women's size, strength, socialization and
lack of training in self-defence are generally different from men's in

73. An example of one voluntary association recognized as a social group is that of
the tontons macoutes: Lucien v. Minister of Employment and Immigration Immigration Appeal Board File M86-1649X (4 May 1987).
In Requena-Cruz v. Minister of Employment and Immigration Immigration Appeal
Board Decision T83-10559 (8 April 1986) per G. Vidal at 5, the Board stated
that "... the ground 'membership in a particular social group' is a ground
which must be given a broad and liberal interpretation in order to protect
groups or individuals who do not necessarily have political, religious or racial
ties at the root of their fear of persecution. Otherwise, this ground of 'social
group' would be of very little value." This interpretation is consistent with the
drafting history of the 1951 Convention which shows that the category of social
group was included in the definition after the other four categories as a 'catchall'. See A.C. Helton, "Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social
Group As a Basis for Refugee Status" (1983) 15 Col. H. Rts. L R. 39 at 40-42.
74. The Refugee in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) at 30.
While in this text Goodwin-Gill questions whether or not women constitute
a social group (Ibid. at 31ff), this seems to be because of his uncertainty as
to whether the discrimination women suffer is sufficient to constitute persecution within the meaning of the Convention. Rather than consider the
extent of the discriminatory treatment under the issue of "social group", it
would be more logical to accept that women are a social group because of
their similar treatment by or with the acquiescence of the state, and look at
the nature of the discrimination/persecution separately.
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ways that typically work to women's disadvantage. 75 Only women can
become pregnant, and women generally are children's primary caregivers. Women's position in the economy is inferior to that of men;
women are paid less for their work (and in the case of homemakers,
receive no wage at all), are subjected to harassment in the workplace
and elsewhere because of their sex, and are less likely to reach senior
positions in the work force. 76 This combination of biological and
socially attributed characteristics make women a social group within
the meaning of the Convention definition.
The existence of the 1953 Convention on the Political Rights of
Women 77 and the 1979 Convention for the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination Against Women 78 supports the notion that women
as a group are in need of international protection of their human
rights. In 1984 the European Parliament adopted a resolution encouraging states to recognize as refugees women who faced persecution
because they had transgressed the social mores of their communities.
The 1985 Soesterburg Conference on refugee women adopted a comparable resolution. In 1985 the Executive Committee of the U.N.H.C.R.
endorsed Conclusion No. 3979 which recognized that states are free to
adopt8 0 an interpretation of social group that would include women
asylum-seekers "who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their
having transgressed the social mores of the society in which they
live". 8 1 This interpretation has been adopted in Criteriafor Detennining

75. Supra, note 11 at 357.
76. See for example: Canada,Equality in Employment: A Royal Commission Report
(Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1984) (Chair: R. Abella) at 24-32.
77. GA. Res. 640 (VII) U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952) at 27.
78. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women:
Second Report of Canada (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1988) at
122-133.
79. Refugee Women and International Protection, 1985 (Executive Committee36th Session).
80. Although the wording of the conclusion appears rather cautious, it is a clear
signal that any state with the political will to do so has the approval of the
U.N.H.C.R. to recognize women in this situation as members of "a particular social group" for the purposes of refugee determination.
81. Supra, note 79 at (k).
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"Convention Refugee" Status, guidelines provided by the U.N.H.C.R.
Legal Project in Canada.82 More recently, the first InternationalConsultation on Refugee Women, which took place in Geneva in November,
1988, "called upon all States, party to international and regional refugee instruments, to consider women who have been persecuted on the
basis of their sex as part of a 'particular social group', within the
meaning of the refugee defimition." 83 These approaches recognize that
the Convention definition of refugee can provide international protection from women-directed persecution by interpreting social group so
as to include women.
Sub-groups of women have been accepted as social groups for the purposes of refugee determination. In Incircyan v. Minister of Employment
and Immigration,8 4 the Immigration Appeal Board held that two
women from Turkey belonged to the social group comprising "single
women living in a Moslem country without the protection of a male
relative". 85 Young Tamil women have been recognized as a social
group by the Immigration and Refugee Board. 86 The acceptance of
'family' as a form of social group is one which has facilitated the recognition as refugees of many women who are not publicly active in
party politics on the basis of their potential identification with their
active husband, father, or brother and therefore risk
more publicly
87
persecution.
82. Guideline 4.53 (Ottawa: 27 February 1989).
83. N. Kelly, "Report on the International Consultation on Refugee Women:
Geneva, 15-19 November 1988, with particular reference to protection
problems" (1989) 1:2 Int.J.Ref.L. 233 at 235.
84. Immigration Appeal Board Decisions M87-1541X and M87-1248, C.L.I.C.
No. 113.12, 10 August 1987. This formulation of a social group was adopted
by the Immigration and Refugee Board in its Decision T89-00260, July 1989.
85. Ibid. at 1, P. Davey.
86. Immigration and Refugee Board Decisions T89-00587, June 1989; M89-01213,
June 1989.
87. In Zarketa v. Minister of Employment and Immigration Immigration Appeal
Board Decision 81-9776, C.L.I.C. No. 80.6, 12 November 1985 per J-P. Houle
at 2 the Board appeared to dismiss the claimant's fear of persecution
because of political opinion, stating that her fear related to her relationship
to her father. In Barra-Velasquez v. Minister of Employment and Immigration
Immigration Appeal Board Decision 80-6300, C.L.I.C. No. 39.7, 30 June 1982
per H.M. Hlady at 3, the Board held that the claimant's persecution arose
out of her membership in a close-knit extended family.
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The Federal Court of Appeal recently considered the meaning of the
term "social group" in Canada(Attorney General)v. Ward88 (hereinafter
Ward). The majority decision interpreted the U.N.H.C.R. Handbook
discussion of the definition of "social group" to mean that "... persecution arising from membership in the group must arise from its activities perceived to be a possible danger of some kind to the
government". 89 This statement by the majority conflates the two distinct enumerated grounds of social group and political opinion. 90 In
addition, the majority appears to have ignored the word "may" in the
Handbook's statement: "Membership in a social group may be at the
root of persecution because there is no confidence in the group's loyalty to the government ... "91 The dissent in Ward argued against such
a restrictive definition of "social group".92
In a subsequent decision of the Federal Court of Appeal, Salibian v.
Minister of Employment and Immigration (hereinafter Salibian),9 3 the
Court held that an Armenian Christian citizen of Lebanon was not
barred from making a claim to refugee status merely because of the
situation of civil war in Lebanon. This calls into question the ruling of
the majority in Ward in that it appears to permit a positive determination in a situation in which a person is persecuted for her membership
in a social group by a party other than the state and the state is
unable to protect her because of the situation of civil war. If the persecution comes from a source outside the state and the state is willing,
but unable, to protect the claimant, it does not follow that the social
group to which a person in this situation belongs is a danger to the
state. Further, the model of refugee as perceived threat to the state
does not reflect the reality of many women's lives. It is women's gen88. (1990), 108 N.R. 60 (F.C.A.D.).
89. Ibid. at 65, Urie J.A.
90. Political opinion includes imputed political opinion. For example, in
Astudillo v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1979), 31 N.R. 121
(F.CA.D.) the Court held that the Immigration Appeal Board had erred in
not taking into account the Chilean government's perception of the
claimant's soccer club activities as a form of political opposition.
91. Supra, note 65 at paragraph 78.
92. "There is in fact nothing absolute about social groups, particularly non-natural social groups." Ward, supra, note 88, MacGuigan JA.at 73.
93. 24 May 1990, A-479-89 (F.CA.D.) [unreported].
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eral lack of power (and thus the improbability of women posing a
threat to the state) that makes it possible for the state and private citizens whose actions are sanctioned by the state to pay women less for
their work, to limit their participation in academic, cultural, and political life, to harm them physically, and to discriminate against or persecute women in other ways. One of the most recognizable forms of
violence against women are the dowry burnings and murder of nonvirgins by their families that claim the lives of many women throughout the world.94 While the women who are killed in these ways pose
no threat to their state, 95 the state lacks the resources or the will to
protect them. To interpret the definition as the majority did in Ward
will reduce the already disproportionately low numbers of women recognized as refugees through inland claims procedures. This is a form
of discrimination against women and arguably violates section 15 of
the Charter.
Counsel for Mr. Ward has made an application for leave to appeal the
decision to the Supreme Court of Canada. It would appear that there
are enough weaknesses in the decision to limit it to its facts until the
Supreme Court rules on the application for leave and, possibly, the
appeal itself
In applying the Convention refugee definition to battered women, one
of the issues to be addressed is the best way in which to characterize
the social group to which they belong. If the group is to be defined on

94. See Heise, supra, note 28 at 14-15; L. Bonnerjea, Shaming the World: The needs of
women refugees (London: World University Press and CHANGE joint publication, 1985) at 19.
95. Women who resist their oppression do pose a threat to the state insofar as
their resistance may call into question state-sanctioned forms of discrimination and persecution against women, particularly when the form of oppression is financially advantageous to the government (as in the case of
unwaged, pensionless childcare and care of the elderly). Women's resistance
may be 'disappeared' or denied however, as in the case of the Iranian
woman who refused to adopt the prescribed dress code for women [supra,
note 65]. The cultural attache of the Iranian embassy characterized the
woman's position as finding a loophole in Canadian immigration laws,
rather than a principled political stand.
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the basis of the characteristics shared by the members, then it is most
logical to define the group as women in general, since battered women
are not all from a single class, race, nationality, or religion. Alternatively, if the group is to be defined by its treatment by society, it makes
most sense to define the group as battered women, since the treatment
that all of the group members have experienced is socially sanctioned
abuse by their partners.
Because battering is not the only form of persecution women experience, it makes sense to define the group as 'women' and consider the
battering under the category of persecution, that being the form persecution takes in these cases. One difficulty with this approach would be
the need to counter the 'floodgates' argument that would almost certainly be raised in opposition to a defirition of social group which
includes millions of members. Practically speaking, this concern has
little foundation, if only because of the economic and social impossibility of migration for most women. In addition, women who claim
refugee status on the basis of belonging to the social group 'women',
must still prove that they have a well-founded fear of persecution in
their country of origin, from which the state does not protect them. In
any case, as noted by Grahl-Madsen, "[olnce a person is subjected to
a measure of such gravity that we consider it 'persecution', that person
is 'persecuted' in the sense of the Convention, irrespective of how
many others are subjected to the same or similar measures". 96
There are also potential problems associated with the social group
'battered women'. There is a possibility that, once removed from the
battering situation, a woman would not be considered to be a member
of that group 9 7 The counter argument, of course, is that the refugee
definition is forward-looking, and that, if returned to her home coun-

96. Supra, note 72, at 213.
97. In Noble, supra, note 13, per G. C. Eglinton at 6, the Board disputed the

applicability of the social group on which Ms Noble based her claim, that
of "poor aging single undefended women", stating that she had not belonged
to that group throughout the period in which- she had been persecuted. In
Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S. 801 F. 2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986) at 1575, while applying a much stricter definition of social group than is used in Canada, an
American Court of Appeal stated in obiter that one of the petitioners who
had reached the age of 33 was, as a result, excluded from the social group of
"young men of military age".
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try, the claimant will again face the same treatment as other battered
women. Another objection to this definition of social group is that since
any woman can become a battered woman because battering crosses all
boundaries, the category is no more distinct than 'women'. Further,
women face different forms of discrimination and persecution all over
the world because they are women.98 It thus seems more appropriate to
consider battering under the heading of persecution, particularly in cases
where the claimant alleges other forms of sex-directed persecution as
well. Because the wrong characterization of the grounds for the claim to
refugee status could result in a negative determination, claimants should
base their claims on both definitions of the social group outlined above
until the decision-makers choose one or the other.
WIFE ASSAULT AS PERSECUTION
The meaning of the phrase "well-founded fear of persecution" must
also be interpreted in a way that recognizes women's experience. Decision-makers must be shown that battering is a form of persecution and
that the evaluation of the "well-foundedness" of a claim based on this
form of persecution requires an approach that takes into account
women's experience of the cycle of violence associated with battering.
As is commonly noted in discussions of the meaning of "persecution"
as it relates to refugee determination, that term is not defmed in the
Convention. The U.N.H.C.R. Handbook states:
"From Article 33 of the Convention, it may be inferred that a threat
to life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political
opinion or membership in a particular social group is always persecution. Other serious violations of human rights-for the same reasons-would also constitute persecution.-"
It may well be that the abuse suffered by a woman whose claim is
based on her well-founded fear of being battered by her partner constitutes a threat to her life or freedom. Certainly women are murdered
by their partners. 1°° As noted in the discussion of battering above, the

98. For a survey of some of the forms women's oppression takes in the world today,
see Heise, supra, note 28, WIN News (Quarterly published by Women's International Network), and Davies, supra, note 28.
99. Supra, note 65 at paragraph 51.
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technique of forcible confinement used by many batterers is a typical
form of abuse which, in some cases, would be sufficiently severe to
constitute a threat to a woman's freedom.
The provisions of international human rights conventions are an
important source of guidance to decision-makers considering
whether or not certain treatment constitutes a serious violation of
human rights and thus persecution within the meaning of the Convention. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides that "[elveryone has the right to life, liberty and security of
the person" 10 1 . Grahl-Madsen states that violations of Article 3
clearly constitute persecution. 10 2 In a recent case, the Immigration
and Refugee Board explicitly adopted this definition of persecution
in its statement that it "agree[d] that a serious threat to the
claimant's 'right to
life, liberty and security of the person' amounts
10 3
persecution".
to
The wording of Article 3 corresponds to the wording of section 7 of
the Charter.104 In Morgentaler v. the Queen1 0 5 the Supreme Court of
Canada held that "security of the person" protects a person's physical
and psychological integrity.l1°6 In P.v. Mills10 7 Lamer J. stated that the
guarantee of "security of the person" protects a person from psycho10 8
logical trauma. In Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration
100. Between 1974 and 1983 there were 812 women killed by their husbands. These
cases account for 41% of the total number of adult female homicides during
that period. Wilson & Daly, supra, note 14.
101. GA. Res. 212 A(III) U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
102. Supra, note 72 at 195.
103. The Board also referred explicitly to Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in Immigration and Refugee Board Decision V89-00683, March
1990 at 7.
104. Section 7 states: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice," supra, note 50.
105. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
106. Ibid. at 173, per Wilson 3.
107. Dickson CJ. adopted the definition of security of the person developed by
Lamer 3. in Mills, [19861 1 S.C.R. 863) in the context of s. 11 of the Charer in
his discussion of s. 7 in Morgentaler,supra, note 105 at 55.
108. [19851 1 S.C.R. 177; 17 D.L.R. (4th) 422 [cited to D.L.R.J.
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Wilson J. held that, at least, " 'security of the person' must encompass
freedom from the threat of physical punishment or suffering as well as
freedom from such punishment itself'. 109 The point here is not that
battered migrant women should necessarily seek protection under section 7 of the Charter,but that the way that this section has been interpreted by Canadian courts provides guidance to the meaning of
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 110 The type
of treatment described in the discussion of wife battering above clearly
threatens a woman's physical and psychological integrity, causes psychological trauma, and involves both the threat and the reality of physical suffering. As such, it violates her right to life, liberty and security
of the person, in contravention of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and thus constitutes persecution within the meaning of
the refugee definition.
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment1 1 1 is the only Convention
other than the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees to
incorporate the principle of "non-refoulement". 112 It is therefore
appropriate to refer to the Convention Against Torture in any consideration of the Refugee Convention. Clearly "persecution" must
comprise, at least, the definition of torture in the Convention
109. Ibid. at 460.
110. The Supreme Court of Canada cases cited in this section were generally concerned with a piece of legislation that allegedly infringed a person's rights
under s.7 of the Charter.In these cases the Court held that state intervention
was required for there to be a violation of s. 7. This does not mean that state
action is required for the positive determination of claims to refugee status
however, since there is a separate body of authorities regarding the role of the
state in refugee claims. This is discussed below.
111. A/RES/39/46, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1984.
112. Article 3(1) of the Convention against Torture States:
"No State Party shall expel, return Crefouler) or extradite a person to another
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture". Note that this Convention's standard of
"substantial grounds" is higher than that of Canadian refugee caselaw.
The idea of comparing the Refugee Convention with the Convention against
Torture was suggested by Noel St. Pierre, U.N.H.C.R. Legal Project Officer at
the Immigration and Refugee Board in Montreal, in a personal communication on 3 April 1990.
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Against Torture. The Convention Against Torture includes in its definition of torture:
" [Any act by which severe pain or suffering whether physical or mental isintentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as intimi-

dating or coercing [her] or a third person, or for any other reason
based on discrimination of any kind."113
This definition of torture includes the kind of violence against
women described earlier in this paper. The Report on Torture1 14 published by Amnesty International outlines methods of torture used
against prisoners around the world. A comparison of the chart
below with the literature regarding wife abuse shows that there is a
remarkable similarity between these techniques and those used by
1 15
abusive partners.

113. Article 1, Convention Against Torture supra note 111.
114. (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1975).
115. The comparison between techniques of torture and those of wife abuse is taken
from submissions written by Jacqueline Greatbatch, staff lawyer and co-leader
of the Immigration Law Group, Parkdale Community Legal Services, Toronto.
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BIDERMAN'S CHART OF COERCION

GeneralMethod

Effects and Purposes

a) Isolation

- Deprives victims of all social support [for the]
ability to resist
- Develops an intense concern with self
- Makes victim dependent upon interrogator

b) Monopolization o f
Perception

- Fixes attention upon immediate predicament;
fosters introspection
- Eliminates stimuli
controlled by captor

competing

- Frustrates all actions
compliance

with

not consistent

those
with

c) Induced Debility and
Exhaustion

- Weakens mental and physical ability to resist

d) Threats

- Cultivates anxiety and despair

e) Occasional Indulgences - Provides positive motivation for compliance
) Demonstrating
"Omnipotence"

- Suggests futility of resistance
- Degradation
- Makes cost of resistance appear more damaging
to self esteem than capitulation
- Reduces prisoner to "animal level" concerns

g) Enforcing Trivial
Demands

- Develops habit of compliance
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Caselaw on the meaning of persecution defines this term to include
much more than torture. In Rajudeen v. Minister of Employment and
Immigration1 16 (hereinafter Rajudeen) the Federal Court of Appeal
quoted with approval dictionary definitions of "persecute" which
emphasized the117repetitive or persistent nature of the cruelty or punishment inflicted.
The claimant in this case experienced the following forms of persecution: vandalism of property in the riot of August 1977; beatings by private citizens in January 1978 and August 1978, from which the police
did not protect him; three incidents of threats of violence being made
against him by private citizens in March and April 1978 and Novem118
ber 1981. In Araya Heredlo v. Ministerof Employment andImmigration
the Immigration Appeal Board held that, while the Convention does
not define torture, "it is quite certain that persecution does not consist
solely in physical torture ....
"119 The Board went on to state:
"..[A]n essential element of persecution is harassment, so much so
that real persecution would be present in the case of a person who
was denied all opportunity to work or even one who, in order to
survive, was forced to accept work manifestly incompatible with his
occupational training. Any repeated or sustained attack on not only a
person's physical integrity, but also on his moral integrity, constitutes
persecution.... "120 [emphasis added.]
The Board decided that the threats of rape made to Mrs. Araya constituted persecution and found her to be a refugee. Actions described in
the preceding cases such as rape, threats, beatings and destruction of
property are all part of the phenomenon of wife abuse. As such they
clearly constitute persecution within the meaning of the refugee defimition.
One approach to the definition of persecution evident in the caselaw
of the Immigration and Refugee Board is the assessment of the degree
of persecution with reference to the extent of the violation of interna-

116. (1984). 55 N.R. 129 (F.C.A.D.).
117. Ibid. at 134.
118. Immigration Appeal Board Decision 76-1127, C.L.I.C. No. 1.11, 20 March 1979.
119. Ibid. at 6.
120. Ibid. at 6-7.
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tional human rights. In the context of a claim based on political opinion, the Board stated:
"In deciding whether or not a refugee claimant has good grounds
to fear persecution, one should look at a claimant's personal history
of political involvement and at the scope and
12 1seriousness of human
rights violations the claimant has endured."
The Board went on to consider the nature of the claimant's violated
rights and concluded that 'high level' human rights, such as those
relating to his physical well-being and liberty had been violated as
well as several lower level rights. 122 While the violation of a lower level
right would not, on its own, constitute persecution, the Board found
that the claimant had a well-founded fear of persecution on cumulative grounds. 123
The facts of each case of migrant women fleeing abuse will have to be
applied separately to the definitions of persecution developed in the
caselaw and from the application of international instruments as outlined above. Nonetheless, it is clear from the literature on violence
against women that the abuse from their partners is comparable to or
the same as the treatment that, when directed at people either by the
state or with the acquiescence of the state, has been recognized as persecution within the meaning of the Convention.
RESISTANCE TO VIEWING WIFE ASSAULT AS PERSECUTION
Despite the fact that the acts of wife assault have a direct parallel in
acts recognized as persecution under the Convention definition, we
have encountered several points of resistance from practitioners and
lay-people in the conceptualization of wife assault as the type of persecution whose victims should be protected under international law.
This resistance takes several forms.
One objection is that since so many women in Canada are abused by
their partners, refugee status cannot protect these claimants from
future violence. The response to this objection is a very practical one:
121. Immigration and Refugee Board Decision M89-0293, September 1989, at 5.
122. Ibid. at 5-6.
123. Ibid. at 7. The Board referred to paragraph 53 of the U.N.H.C.R. Handbook's
discussion of "cumulative grounds" for the basis of a refugee claim in its decision. The Board took a similar approach in an earlier decision: Immigration
and Refugee Board Decision T89-00146/T89-00147; July 1989.
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while we cannot guarantee a woman's safety forever from wife abuse
by recognizing her as a refugee, refugee status has never been an
unconditional and permanent guarantee of safety. Compliance with
the Convention means neither that the state of refuge has a perfect
human rights record1 24 nor that the rights violated in the country of
origin will be absolutely protected in the country of refuge. 12 5 A coup,
the imposition of a state religion, or the flaring of racial tensions in
any given country could well put a resettled refugee at risk of persecution of the same nature as the treatment she originally fled. On the
other hand, according refugee status to a woman whose violent partner
has no right to enter Canada does provide her with what is probably
126
the most effective form of protection against further abuse: distance.
An argument based on distance is only effective if the abuser is not in
Canada. If taken to the extreme this may lead to the proposition that
if the abuser is legally in Canada, returning the woman to her home

124. We note here the example of the recognition of a black South African as a refugee by Canada, [see Thomas v. Minister of Employment andImmigration Immigration Appeal Board Decision M82-1096, C.L.I.C. No. 59.7, 25 April 19831 a
country in which the oppression of indigenous peoples is institutionalized.
125. For example, a person who was recognized as a refugee because of her fear of
persecution for her activities within the formerly outlawed Solidarity will also
face some restrictions on her union activity in Canada.
126. During a discussion with an employee of the Immigration and Refugee Board
a concern was raised regarding the possibility that the control exerted by an
abusive partner could be used to force a woman to sponsor her husband. In
our experience at Parkdale Community Legal Services we have observed that
women do not easily leave their homes and extended family in order to escape
their partners; they leave because they know they face serious harm, even
death if they do not and their worst nightmare is that their partners find them
again. They would not do anything that would make it possible for their husbands to come to Canada. That said, it remains true that one of the elements
in a spousal sponsorship is that the visa officer must be satisfied that the marriage is genuine. If a woman has been admitted to Canada through a refugee
claim based on persecution by her husband, it is reasonable to presume that
the sponsorship is not bona fide. While we are not eager to provide immigration officers with another presumption against a positive recommendation for
landing, this presumption would only apply to women whose successful refugee
claims were based on wife assault and, like all presumptions, it would be
rebuttable (e.g. if there were evidence of the husband's complete rehabilitation).
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country would be an appropriate solution. 12 7 However, if the woman
actually believes she will be safest in her home country, she will probably elect to go home and will not appear in a law office. In any case,
there is often no way of ensuring that her spouse will not follow her if
she is deported, or that he will not enjoin his or her family or friends
128
remaining in the the home country to punish her upon her return.
Further, the position of a separated or divorced woman may be untenable in the country of origin.
Although Canada still falls short of protecting women, the shelter
movement and action around the issue of violence against women in
the last twenty years has provided options and support networks which
make Canada "safer" than many other countries. 12 9 Wife assault and
marital rape are crimes for which the perpetrator may be punished in
Canada where they are not in many other countries. Also, although
single women are still generally ghettoized and differentially poor in
Canada, they are not ostracized, or stoned or starved to death as in
some other countries. Therefore, while the distance argument may not
apply in all cases, there are still reasons why a woman may receive
better protection in Canada than she would in her country of origin,
despite the presence of the abusive man.
A further objection to the acceptance of refugee claims by battered
women is that Canada should not be critical of other cultures' values
and practices. Certainly the recognition as rfugees of victims of violence against women implies censure of that violence in the same way
that the recognition of claimants whose claims are based on their
127. This is most pertinent to women whose sponsorships have been withdrawn,
discussed in detail below, but also arises in the case of refugee women when
both spouses have claimed refugee status in Canada.
128. Although we have no documentary evidence of this occurring since it would
require continued contact with the client after departure from Canada, in
Parkdale Community Legal Services' experience it is a common threat by husbands to women who express their wish to separate from them.
129. This is supported by J. Seager & A. Olson, Women in the World: An International Atlas (London: Pan Books, 1986). Canada ranks among the top countries
with respect to a Status of Women Index based on literacy, suffrage, paid work
and life expectancy (Map 1), as well as being among the top in the number of
shelters (Map 3). Although not directly measuring safety, they do indicate state
and community support for battered women, as well as greater options available to women.
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political opinion "implicitly condemns the regime from which they
flee". 130 This is because it acknowledges that there has been a serious
violation of international standards of human rights. That recognition
as a refugee is the obverse of the coin of international human rights
law is clear from the approach of the Immigration and Refugee Board
in the case cited above. As noted by Arthur Helton:"[p]resumably,
where the U.N. sees fit to outlaw persecution aimed at a particular
group, it would also wish to provide
sanctuary for those who suffer at
131
the hands of transgressor states".
In the same way that the Convention protects those facing persecution
because their religion or culture violates another culture's requirement
of 'purity', the Convention must protect a member of any social group
whose desire for basic human rights offends the dominant culture. In
doing so the Convention employs the least intrusive means possible;
there is no direct interference with the impugned cultural practices
since, by definition, a refugee must be outside her country of origin in
order to make a claim to protection. If the potential claimant has
already rejected the discriminatory practices of her culture (and how
something that is imposed on half of the members of the cultural
group constitutes part of the culture is an interesting question1 32) then
refugee status offers her protection without direct interference in the
country of origin or the international publicity of formal diplomatic
protest As a form of censure it is definitely at the low end of the
133
'intrusiveness' scale.

Further, Canada as a country has a strong commitment to equality and
to human rights, as shown by the equality provisions and human rights
130. S.B. Young "Who is a Refugee? A Theory of Persecution" (1982) In Defence of
the Alien 38 at 39. For an illustration of this point in the American context, see
"Political Legitimacy in the Law of Political Asylum" (1985) 99 Harvard L. R.
450 at 458-459.
131. Supra, note 73 at 40.
132. "There is nothing 'African' about injustice or violence, whether it takes the
form of mistreated wives and mothers, or slums, or [female] circumcision ... "
Quotation from the Kenyan women's magazine VIA in Heise, "Crimes of
Gender", supra, note 28 at 19.
133. In any case, as a signatory to both the Convention and the Protocol, Canada
has an obligation to provide protection to people who meet the refugee defmition. The Convention does not exempt from protection those people whose
persecution arises out of the culture of the country of origin.
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contained in the Charter,and expressly incorporated into the Immigration
Act. Canada is also a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. The right to physical integrity is a basic
human right, guaranteed equally to men and women.
A final difficulty in fitting wife assault to the popular conception of
refugee may be the source and location of the persecution. Wife
assault generally occurs in the home, in what has been labelled the
private as opposed to the public sphere. By definition the assailant has
a personal relationship with the potential claimant; he is not an anonymous representative of the state. In Western liberal democratic
thought, the private sphere is that which is unregulated by government: 134 "a man's home is his castle". This has several important ramifications for the work presented here. First, persecution, including
recognized persecution against women, is conceptualized as occurring
in the public sphere, with normatively male forms of oppression and
resistance. 135 An acceptance of the public/private dichotomy leaves
this construction unexamined. Further, the state connection required
in the definition of refugee may be difficult to see, since the state never
actively commits and seldom overtly condones this type of violence
against women. Although the state connection requirement is treated
in detail in the following section, the public/private issue bears directly
on the difficulties in making that connection. Finally, the location of
wife assault out of the public eye renders the compilation of evidence
to support a case difficult.
The bifurcation of social relations into public and private spheres has
been attacked by feminists in a number of ways. First, the delineation
of what constitutes public and private is not constant historically or
geographically: it is socially constructed. 136 Also, the definition of public and private varies with the perspective from which it is viewed: the
cotton field may have been viewed as private from the slave-owner's
perspective, but public from the slave's. Similarly, the man may view
134. K. O'Donovan, Sexual Divisions in Law (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson,
1985) at 1.
135. See Greatbatch, supra, note 64, which explains as well as critiques this position
in part.
136. O'Donovan, supra, note 134, in particular c. 4.
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his home as his sanctuary; the woman may view it as her place of
work, the place where her work and worth are on view, and where she
137
is most in danger.
Further, the notion that there is a sphere which is unregulated by the
state has been challenged. The state's omission of direct regulation is
not non-regulation, it is delegation. The regulation is left to those who
already possess the power. In a patriarchal society, this means men.
The state's regulation of the private sphere and, in particular, the relations between men and women, can be most clearly seen in three
areas: family law, social assistance law and criminal law. The right to
consent to marriage, the legality of divorce, whether or not both men
and women have a right to obtain a divorce or have custody of the
children, the grounds for divorce, the availability of support and the
conditions under which it may be obtained, and the division of assets
all affect the position of women vis-a-vis men in the private sphere.
The availability of social assistance, including health care, crisis care
and affordable housing, also affects the options women have upon
entering into or leaving a marriage and therefore their bargaining
position in the home. Similarly, the existence and enforcement of laws
governing abortion, wife assault and marital rape all affect women's
position in the home. 13 8 From this view, the state is clearly and
directly implicated in the lack of protection of women who are endangered in their homes.
137. See T.S. Dahl & A. Snare, "The coercion of privacy: a feminist perspective" in
C. Smart, ed, Women, Sexuality and Social Control (London: Routledge, Kegan
& Paul, 1978) 8 for further discussion of the private sphere as a 'prison' for
women. See also Lavallee, supra, note I1 at 365.
138. For further discussion, see, for example, M. McIntosh, "The state and the oppression of women" in A. Kuhn & A. Wolpe, eds, Feminism andMaterialism (London:
Routledge, Kegan & Paul, 1978) 254, and "The family, regulation, and the public
sphere" in G. MacLennan & S. Hall, eds., State and Society in ContemporaryBritain (Cambridge: Polity, 1984); C. Smart The 77es that Bind (London: Routledge,
Kegan & Paul, 1984); . Ursel, "The State and the Maintenance of Patriarchy: a
Case Study of Family, Labour and Welfare Legislation in Canada" in J. Dickinson & B. Russell, eds, Family,Economy and State (Toronto: Garamond, 1986) 150;
M. Abramowitz, Regulating the Lives of Women (Boston: South End, 1988); E. Wilson, Women and the Welfare State (London: Tavistock, 1977); SAM. Gavigan,
"Women and Abortion in Canada: What's Law got to Do with It?" in HJ.
Maroney & M. Luxton, eds, Feminism and PoliticalEconomy (Toronto: Methuen,
1987) 263; Hanmer & Maynard, supra, note 30.
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The division of society into public and private has also been used
descriptively to mean 'outside the home', in relation to other people,
and 'in the home', among the family. This division does not rely on
the presence or absence of state regulation, and therefore is analytically meaningless in a discussion of the state's responsibility or activity
within the private sphere.139 However, this conception of public and
private does illuminate an important division between what is and is
not visible. Visibility has several significant consequences for assaulted
migrant women claiming refugee status.
The dominant (and most visible) group in a society plays a major role
in setting the publicly acknowledged agenda for that society. The further a group is from the sources of power, the less likely it is that their
concerns will be noticed by politicians or the producers and reproducers of culture.140 In a market economy, those with money, traditionally
men, ensure that what they read about and what receives political
action reflects their concerns and, further, does not threaten their
power base. For example, violence against women, including wife
assault, although a recognized political issue in the 19th century
women's movement, has effectively 'disappeared' from public view
until the second wave of feminism rediscovered it, despite the fact that
there is no evidence that the incidence of violence against women
The list of areas of state regulation is not exhaustive: inheritance laws, pension
laws, tax laws, employment laws, constitutional laws and many others also all
have an impact on social relations.
Note also that the notion of state regulation through law is not as
unproblematic as implied in the discussion herein. Law itself cannot be seen
as a direct 'arm of the state' or the interests of the dominant class, but rather
the relationship is complicated by ideological considerations, resistance of
non-dominant groups and the internal constraints of the legal system itself: for
further discussion, see S.A.M. Gavigan, "Law, Gender and Ideology" in A.F.
Bayefsky, ed., Legal Theory Meets Legal Practice(Edmonton: Academic Printing
and Publishing, 1988) 283, and C. Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (London: Routledge, 1989).
139. "The political nature of oppression rests upon its relation to the state, rather
than the realm of human endeavour affected.": Greatbatch, supra, note 64 at
523.
140. E.S. Herman & N. Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (New York: Pantheon,
1988), in particular c. I. Note that, at least in North America, government funding and taxation of community groups, political parties, the media and so on
contribute to the notion that the state also has a role in regulating what issues
and people become visible to the public.
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decreased during the intervening period. The first wave of feminism
challenged not only the sexual and economic rights of men within the
liquor as a major contributing factor and
family, but also identified
141
attacked the liquor trade.
Along with determining what is in the public's eye, how an issue is
presented when it can no longer remain invisible is also influenced

greatly by those in the dominant group. Although wife assault came to
the public's attention in the early 1970's, the radical feminist view that
it was a political issue, with its genesis in the unequal power relations
between men and women, 14 2 was subverted. The political analysis gave
way in part to psychological and therapeutic models of 'sick' men and
'masochistic' women. Sociological analyses were also developed,
including resource theory, systems theory, exchange theory, structural
analyses and sociocultural analyses. 14 3 While not arguing that these
other theories have no useful insights, they all allow the basic fact that
it is men that beat women to remain more or less unexamined. Wife
assault is thus not seen as a political issue (except by some feminists),
and can be relegated to the sidelines as a 'social' or 'mental health'
issue. As such, the characterization of wife assault as persecution, with
its inherently political connotation 144 is rendered even more difficult
Degendering wife assault has the further consequence of making it
appear random, whereas persecution is seen as a non-random event,
perpetrated by repressive governments against identifiable groups or
people for political reasons. In fact, 'spousal abuse' is not random, but
highly gendered in virtually every country.
An examination of the public/private dichotomy reveals that the reluctance to view wife assault as persecution invoking international protection is in large part ideological. Most of us in Canada have families or

141. L. Gordon, Heroes of Their Own Lives (New York: Penguin, 1988), c. 8; S. Jefferys, The Spinster and Her Enemies (London: Pandora, 1985).
142. For a recent review article on radical feminist thought on this issue, see A.
Edwards, "Male Violence in Feminist Theory: an Analysis of the Changing
Conceptions of Sex/Gender Violence and Male Dominance" in Hanmer &
Maynard, eds, supra, note 30.
143. For reviews, see M. Bograd, "Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse: An
Introduction" in Yllo & Bograd, supra, note 14 at 11, and Gelles, supra, note 29,
c. l.
144. Supra, note 64 at 524.
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come from families; most of us believe that what happens within our
families, in our homes, is private, and, further, the particularities of
that home could not be understood or known by outside observers. If
one starts from this view, that there is something inherently different
about what occurs in the home which should not be subject to public
scrutiny or sanction, then torture by close relations will seem qualitatively distinct from torture by army officers.
From the perspective of those who hold power in the family, the qualitative difference holds up: the difference lies in the proximal agents of
persecution. To believe otherwise would be to subject the husband's
acts in the family to scrutiny and sanction and comparison to official
agents of persecution, and our dominant culture, including law and
the media, has been formed in large part by men who are husbands.
Most men reject an analogy between themselves in their positions of
power within their families and army officers and their positions of
power in an army dictatorship. 14 5
From the perspective of the victim, the difference is not as apparent. The
woman's body will still be raped, mutilated and/or dead, regardless of
whether the perpetrator is the husband or a stranger army officer.
In addition to unmasking the ideological component, breaking down
the public/private dichotomy also illuminates the role of the state in
setting the scene in which wife assault occurs and in directing and
limiting the roles of the actors. Wife assault does not occur in a vacuum; 146 the positions and relative strengths of the parties are greatly
influenced by laws, enforcement of those laws and social mores resulting in part from those laws or their lack. Understanding conceptually
how the state can be seen to condone or even promulgate activities
within the home both justifies and lays the basis for the establishment
of state connection to persecution that takes the form of wife assault.
Even having overcome the ideological and conceptual hurdles, however, the fact that wife assault occurs in the home still presents grave
evidentiary problems. Independent corroboration of a woman's story is

145. This is not to suggest that all men are persecutors, but only that they are
accountable, as any other human being, for the harm which they perpetrate
through an abuse of power. Women who abuse their children are likewise
accountable.
146. Lavallee, supra, note II at 343-4.
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often very difficult: there are usually no witnesses and no newspaper
reports of the event. 47 The lack of press and media coverage of wife
assault, particularly in the international context, means that amassing
documentation on a country's record with respect to wife assault is
very difficult, if not impossible. Again, understanding that the lack of
evidence for wife assault claims is not because the persecution is
unimportant or non-existent, but because the nature of the persecution
itself and the socially constructed meaning of it, will not in itself produce the necessary evidence. However, such an understanding can
and
inform arguments with respect to the unavailability of evidence
148
the Board's responsibility for using its powers to obtain it.
THE REQUIREMENT OF STATE CONNECTION
The U.N.H.C.R. Handbook discusses the issue of the source of persecution:
"Where serious discriminatory or other offensive acts are committed by the local populace, they can be considered as persecution if
they are knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities
refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective protection." 149
This echoes Grahl-Madsen's position that "behaviour tolerated by the
government in such a way as to leave the victims virtually unprotected
by the agencies of the State" 150 constitutes persecution for the purpose
of refugee determination. He goes on to state:
"There is actually valid reasons for contending that even if a government has the best of wills to prevent atrocities on the part of the
public (or certain elements of the population), but for some reason
or other is unable to do this, so that the treatened [sic] persons
to escape injury, such persons shall
must leave the country in order
be considered true refugees." 15 1
This issue has also been considered by Guy Goodwin-Gill:

147. Occasionally there may be police records, but the client may be reluctant to
access them for fear of alerting her abuser to her whereabouts.
148. See also the section on "Refugee Determination Procedures", infra.
149. Supra, note 65 at paragraph 65.
150. Supra, note 72 at 189.
151. Ibid. at 191.
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"Governments may be unable to suppress such [violent] activities,
they may be unwilling or reluctant to do so, or they may even be
colluding with those responsible. In such cases, where the protection is in fact unavailable, persecution within the Convention can
result, for it does not follow that the concept is limited to the
actions of governments or their agents. " 152
Goodwin-Gill goes on to note that the source of the persecution may
depend on the reason behind it. He notes that persecution on the
ground of "immutable" characteristics such as race or religion often
emanates from members of the general population while persecution
because of political opinion is usually the result of "direct, official
action". 153 This suggests that persecution on account of membership
in the social group 'women' is likely to arise from private individuals
rather than directly from the state.
In Ward, the majority rejected the presumption employed by the
Immigration Appeal Board that evidence of the lack of state protection
creates a likelihood of persecution and the well-foundedness of the
claimant's fear, and held that the Board should have assessed the evidence regarding the claimant's fear of persecution. 154 The majority's
treatment of the issue of the state's inability to protect a claimant was
unclear- at one point it seems to have stated that state involvement in
the persecution feared is required, 15 5 while at another point it stated
that the Board erred only in applying the presumption, and made the
following statement about state involvement in persecution:
"If a claimant is "unwilling" to avail himself of the protection of
his country of nationality, it is implicit from that fact that his
unwillingness stems from his belief that the state and its authorities,
cannot protect him from those he fears will persecute him. That
inability may arise because the state and its authorities are either
themselves the direct perpetrators of the feared acts of persecution,
assist actively those who do them or simply turn a blind eye to the
activities which the claimant fears... IThere may well be other
manifestations of it. ...156

152. Supra, note 74 at 42.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Ahid.
Supra note 88 at 67.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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In a much clearer discussion of the issue of state involvement in persecution, MacGuigan J. A. adopted the passage from the U.N.H.C.R.
Handbook quoted above. 157 (It is worth noting that, although he did
not refer to the same quotation in his judgement, Urie J.A did refer
with approval to the Handbook.15 8) MacGuigan also held that being
"unwilling", within the meaning of the Convention definition, to avail
oneself of the protection of one's country of origin included situations
in which the unwillingness arose because of the state's inability to provide protection. 159 He noted that while this would broaden the eligibility for admission to Canada, such a result would be consistent with
the objectives of Canadian immigration policy, namely the need to fulfil "Canada's international obligations with respect to refugees and [to
uphold] its humanitarian tradition with respect to the displaced and
persecuted". 160
Given the apparent contradictions in the majority judgement, the clarity of the minority judgement, and the subsequent decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Salibian that a state of civil war (in which a
state is unable to protect its citizens) is not a barrier to a refugee
claim, it appears that the inability of a state to protect a claimant
should be grounds for a positive determination. This position finds
support in other Federal Court of Appeal jurisprudence as well as in
the caselaw of both the Immigration Appeal Board and the Immigration and Refugee Board.
In Rajudeen the claimant, a Tamil from Sri Lanka, had been threatened and assaulted on several occasions by members of the Sinhalese
community. During the communal riots the police, who were of the
Sinhalese majority, would arrive after the violence had occurred. Their
failure to provide protection only aggravated the situation, according
to the claimant. The claimant had not approached the police for protection with regard to the assaults by private citizens. "[Blecause the
police were of the Sinhalese majority, he had no confidence that they
would protect him." 161 The Court concluded that:

157. Ibid. at 77.
158. Ibid. at 64.
159. Ibid. at 76-77.
160. Section 3 (g) of the Immigration Act, quoted in Ward, ibid. at 78.
161. Rajudeen, supra, note 116 at 131, Heald JA.
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"[Iln order to satisfy the [Convention] definition the persecution
complained of must have been committed or been condoned by the
state itself and consist either of conduct directed by the state toward
the individual or in it knowingly tolerating the behaviour of private
citizens, or refusing or being unable to protect the individual from such
behaviour."162 [emphasis added.]
This Federal Court of Appeal case clearly includes those whose state
of origin is unwilling or unable to protect them from serious harm
within the Convention definition. Further, the Court in this case
accepted that the claimant's reasons for not approaching the police
(because the police were of a different race and religion, he had no
confidence that they would protect him) were valid. These two points
have a direct parallel in the cases of most battered women. First, the
state connection to the violence in such cases is an indirect one, as in
Rajudeen. While the agents of the state are not the immediate source of
persecution, by failing to investigate or charge the assailant in wife
battering cases, the state is showing its unwillingness or inability to
protect the claimant Second, the decision legitimizes a claimant's failure to approach the authorities in refugee claim cases in which it is
reasonable to believe that the authorities cannot or will not protect the
claimant. In Rajudeen the claimant's identification of the police as
members of the racial group from whom he feared further threats and
assaults was a reasonable basis for this belief. Surely the decision of a
battered woman not to approach a predominantly male police force
which she believes, based on her own or others' experience, will not
take any effective action against the batterer is as reasonable as the
decision of Mr. Rajudeen, especially given the likelihood of another
beating from her batterer to 'punish' her for her ineffective attempt to
obtain protection.
In Surujpal v. Minister of Employment and Immigration163 the Federal
Court of Appeal applied Rajudeen to a situation in which the claimants had requested assistance from the police on two occasions but
had been refused. The Court held that, having attempted to avail
themselves of the state's protection and failed, the claimants had
brought themselves within the refugee definition. In quoting from the
Rajudeen decision in the context of his discussion of the meaning of

162. Ibid. at 133, Stone JA.
163. (1985), 60 N.R. 73 (F.C.A.D.).
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"state complicity in the broader sense", 164 MacGuigan JA-, writing for
the Court, implied that both unwillingness and inability to act are
forms of state complicity.165 In his dissenting judgement in Ward,
MacGuigan J.A. stated that Surujpal had not narrowed the definition
of state complicity, but had merely applied the definition to a factual
1
situation in which state complicity had taken a more obvious form. 6
The Immigration Appeal Board incorporated the broad meaning of
state complicity into its decision-making. In Lucien v. Minister of
Employment and Immigration167 the Board held that the actions taken
against former tontons macoutes, in Haiti, by private citizens after the
fall of the Duvalier regime constituted persecution to the extent that
the state was unable to protect the claimant. In Sevilla v. Minister of
Employment and Immigration168 the Board stated that the state must
provide adequate protection to persons whose physical integrity has
been threatened, and recognized as a refugee the Costa Rican claimant, who had received threatening telephone calls from Nicaraguans
because of his assistance to Nicaraguan contras. In Ajodhia v. Ministry
of Employment and Immigration1 69 the Board held that the claimant,
who feared persecution from the other major racial group in her coun-

164. Ibid. at 75.
165. Ibid. at 75-76. MacGuigan JA.considered both the Rajudeen and Surujpal decisions in Saliacum v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1989), 99 N.R. 171
(F.C.A.D.), a case in which the refugee claimant was a hereditary chief of the
Puyallup people claiming asylum from the United States. He distinguished the
two earlier cases on the basis that neither dealty with a claim against a federal
state and that both involved police acquiesence rather than a judicial process,
as in Satiacum, and held that they had been wrongly applied in that case. The
situation of battered immigrant women is distinguishable from that of Robert
Satiacum in that battered women do not allege that they are being prosecuted
and jailed through an unjust judicial process, but that they are denied the protection of their state because of the indifference or ineffectiveness of the police
and the judiciary. In this they resemble the claimants in Rajudeen and Surujpal, who suffered "illegal and violent harassment... by intolerant majorities,
with police acquiescence or indifference which amounted to State complicity in
the persecution", (Satiacum at 175).
166. Ward supra, note 88 at 76.
167. Supra, note 72.
168. Immigration Appeal Board Decision M87-1467, 24 November 1987.
169. Immigration Appeal Board Decision M85-1709, 12 November 1987.
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try of origin, could not be faulted for not approaching the police for
protection, since the majority of police officers were of the racial group
she feared. The Immigration and Refugee Board has also followed
Rajudeen in a recent case involving former citizens of Chile who had
moved to Venezuela following the military coup in 1973. One
claimant's verbal opposition to the Chilean government at a gathering
of Chilean exiles was followed soon after by anonymous threatening
telephone calls, assaults on the claimant, the abduction of his son, and
the destruction of his property. While the Venezuelan police initially
provided special security for the claimants' family, they were subsequently told by the police " 'in an indirect way' (emphasis that of the
claimant) that nothing could be done, that it was difficult for the
police because it was a political affair involving nationals of other
countries". 170 The Board concluded that the resources of the Venezuelan police were inadequate to prevent further violence against the
claimants and their family1 71 and determined them to be refugees.
The caselaw outlined above establishes that, to be successful, a claimant must establish a state connection to the feared persecution which
takes one of the following forms: active involvement in the persecution, active assistance of the persecution, turning a blind eye to the
persecution or unwillingness to offer protection, and inability to protect the persecuted. The last three forms of state connection listed are
particularly applicable to the claims of battered women. 172 The cate170. Immigration and Refugee Board Decision T89-03176, T89-03177; 3 January
1990, at 3, A- Ker Q.C.
171. Ibid. at 6.
172. Lazo-Majano v. Immigration and Naturalization Service 813 F. 2d 1432 (9th Cir.
1987) is an example of a refugee claim by an assaulted woman which the
Court analysed as involving the state's active participation in the persecution.
In that case the claimant had been forced into a continuing relationship of
abuse by a low-ranking member of the Salvadoran military in which he had
tortured her by means of rape, threats, beatings and psychological torture such
as holding two grenades against her head. This torture was not part of the
man's "official duties". One of the threats the man used against the claimant,
however, was that he could do whatever he wanted to her with impunity
because no one would "get involved" with a member of the armed forces and,
in any case, he could avoid punishment for killing her by saying that she was
a subversive. The majority stated that the claimant faced persecution as a
result of an imputed political opinion, namely that she was a subversive, and
that her reasons for not approaching the authorities for protection also constituted a political opinion, a belief that there is no political control over the
excesses of the military. (The dissenting judge appears to believe that torture is
justified if the torturer wants to take the victim to meet his parents [at 14331.)
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gory of the state's active assistance would include those situations in
which the police charge both the batterer and the victim.173 Examples
of turning a blind eye or being unwilling to provide protection include
the police not charging the batterer when they attend at the scene of
an assault or not responding to a report of assault. Inability to protect
the person would encompass situations such as that in the Immigration and Refugee Board case cited above in which the Venezuelan
police implied to the claimant that they could not provide his family
with effective protection.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in K v. Lavallee is
instructive with regard to the development of a standard of review for
refugee claims based on wife assault that recognizes the reality of
assaulted women's experience. 174a In that case the Court held that
what was reasonable for an assaulted woman to do to prevent injury
to herself was different than the reasonableness standard that applied
to two men who are strangers and pick a fight in a bar.174 The Court
accepted that the cyclical nature of wife assault means that it may be
possible for a woman to accurately predict not only when she will be
beaten by her husband, but also whether or not this beating is potentially life-threatening1 75 and that this could justify a defence of selfdefence in situations that might otherwise appear not to warrant such
a finding. Similarly, information about wife assault reveals that police
While the majority reached the right result, its reasoning is unnecessarily complicated. The Court could have reached the same result by recognizing that the
claimant was persecuted because she was a woman (or possibly, a working
class woman without influence with the military), that her treatment by her
assailant was torture or, at least, a violation of her human right to security of
the person, and therefore constituted persecution, and that her failure to
approach the authorities was justified because, as in the case of Mr. Rajudeen,
they could not or would not protect her. She therefore had a well-founded fear
of persecution, was unable or unwilling to avail herself of the protection of her
state, and was thus a refugee within the meaning of the Convention definition.
173. This has happened to our clients at Parkdale Community Legal Services and is
confirmed by research: see E.A. Stanko "Missing the Mark?. Policing Battering"
in J. Hanmer, J. Radford and EA. Stanko, eds., Women, Policing and Male Yiolence: InternationalPerspectives (London: Routledge, 1989) 46 at 54; KJ. Ferraro,

"The Legal Response in the United States" in Hantner, ibkl 155 at 169-170.
174a. Supra, note 11.
174. Tid. at 348, 353-354.
175. IAid. at 354-356.
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response is often ineffective1 76 and that men continue to batter women
even after the relationship is over and the women have moved
away. 17 7 Decision-makers considering the refugee claim of an
assaulted woman should weigh the claimant's sworn testimony as to
her reasons for not relocating within her country of origin 1 78 or
appealing to the police for protection against a standard of reasonable
behaviour outlined by the literature on the topic of wife assault. As
recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada, this will not be the traditional standard of the 'reasonable man'.
"If it strains credulity to imagine what the 'ordinary man' would do
in the position of a battered spouse, it is probably because men do
not typically find themselves in that situation. Some women do,
however. The definition of what is reasonable must be adapted to circumastances which ar, by and lar foreign to the world inhabited by
the hypothetical reasonable man "'
[emphasis added.]

Applying the refugee defimition to the situation of an assaulted woman
in a way that recognizes the different standard by which her claim
must be measured means, among other things, 180 accepting the reasonableness of her choice to flee rather than to contact the police force
since going to the police will be at best a temporary reprieve for which
she is likely to be punished by her husband.
176. MacLeod, supra, note 18 at 38-39; Pressman, supra, note 23 at 20; Freedman,
supra, note 29 at 55.
177. "Physical distance, separate residences, and legal restraining orders did little to
prevent violence." J. Giles-Sims Wife Battering:A Systems Theory Approach (New
York: Guilford Press, 1983) at 138 quoted in MacLeod, supra, note 10 at 20.
178. This approach would be an appropriate application of the position expressed
in the U.N.H.C.R. Handbook that " a person will not be excluded from refugee
status merely because he could have sought refuge in another part of the same
country, if under all the circumstances it would not have been reasonable to
expect him to do so": Greatbatch, supra, note 65 at paragraph 91.
179. Lavallee, supra, note II at 346.
180. Another way of applying an appropriate standard in wife assault refugee
claims would be to recognize that the cyclical nature of wife assault means
that, absent evidence of the successful rehabilitation of the assailant, past persecution is a clear indicator of at least the "reasonable possibility" of future
persecution required by the Federal Court of Appeal in Adjei v. Minister of
Employment andImmigration, [19891 2 F.C. 680 (F.CAD.) at 683 and restated in
Salibian,supra, note 93 at 9.

Assaulted Migrant Women's Claims to Refugee Status
In at least one case, decision-makers applied the wrong test and, as a result
denied the claim of a woman who had faced life-long abuse at the hands
of a fellow citizen. In Noblel l the Board was not actually dealing with a
claim based on wife assault so the Board's conclusions regarding "social
group" are not applicable to wife assault claims; the case is nonetheless relevant to an examination of refugee claims based on wife assault in terms of
the Board's approach to the issue of state connection to the feared persecution. The claimant had been beaten and injured by the same brutal man
on many occasions throughout her life. This man had also assaulted her
friends and relatives because of their connection to her. She had gone to
the police for protection in 1948 as a result the man had been fined.
Throughout her adult life she moved from community to community up to
three times annually in order to escape from her assailant In 1966 she
again approached the police for protection, after a beating in which this
man had broken her arm. The police officer initially discouraged her from
proceeding but subsequently instituted proceedings against her assailant In
1969 the man was sentenced to three months' imprisonment. The claimant
left her country and came to Canada, where she lived without status for
several years. After learning that her assailant had been sentenced to life
imprisonment for murder, she returned to her country of origin. After his
release as a result of an amnesty, she encountered him again. As a result
she moved to another community and subsequently returned to Canada.
After leaving the country she learned that her assailant seriously assaulted
her former business partner.
The Board gave a number of reasons for refusing the refugee claim.
Two of their reasons concerned the definition of "social group" as
"poor aging single women". The Board's objections to the claim on
182
these grounds are not applicable to the claims of battered women.
181. Supra, note 13.
182. The Board said that since the claimant had not always been "a poor single
aging woman" she could not base her claim on membership in that social
group. The Board erred in not taking a forward-looking approach, which is the
essence of the Convention. As the claimant aged, she would be less able to
escape her assailant by moving to a different community. She would also be
even less able to defend herself or escape from him, so that there would be
much more than a reasonable possibility of him seriously injuring or even killing her. The Board also denied that her persecution was related to her social
group. Again, her membership in the specified social group made her more
vulnerable to attack and less able to protect herself (for example, if she had
been rich she could have hired a bodyguard) and this should have been suffi-

cient to bring her within the refugee definition.
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The Board also stated that there was no evidence beyond the
claimant's dealings with the police that they refused or failed to protect the claimant, members of the same social group, or anyone else. It
was clear that the Board found the claimant to be credible and that
the Board members believed her testimony, so the real issue was
whether or not what the claimant had described was a refusal or failure to provide protection. In approximately forty years of beatings the
claimant's assailant was fined once and imprisoned for three months.
This result cannot be sufficient to constitute protection. The claimant's
few contacts with the police strengthen her position that the state
could not offer her adequate protection: the question is why she did
not report the assaults to the police more often. Why would anyone
move her residence several times a year for many years rather than
make a request for police protection? The Board itself gives the only
logical answer when it states that the ability of anyone to protect the
claimant from her assailant is a "doubtful matter. 183 (In fact, the
claimant evaluated her own situation well enough to realize that the
only thing that could protect her in her country of origin was distance;
she moved frequently in her country of origin and was safe from
assault during the periods in which she lived in Canada). Refugee
determination is concerned with the future prospects of persecution,
and the Board is very clear in its belief that the claimant cannot
expect to be protected by the police in her country of origin. As discussed earlier, the inability of the state to protect its citizens is justification for the positive determination of a refugee claim and the Board
erred in not applying Rajudeen in this case.
The Board quoted from another Immigration Appeal Board case
which stated that a desire to escape an environment of "criminality"
could not be the basis for a refugee claim. 184 In that case the claimant
had based her claim on having had her handbag stolen. She reported
the robbery to the police, who attempted unsuccessfully to apprehend
the robbers. On its facts, this case is quite different from Noble and its
use in the latter case obscures the important issues around state connection to persecution.

183. Noble, supra, note 13 at S.
184. Hyacinth Saunders v. Minister of Employment and Immigration Immigration
Appeal Board Decision M85-1954, 22 April 1987, at 4, quoted in Noble, ibid. at
7-8.
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The Board also quoted from the Federal Court case of Williams v.
Minister of Employment and Immigration185 in which Strayer JA
"assumed" that the protection of section 7 of the Charter against the
fear of physical persecution by the state as defined in Singh did not
extend to the fear of physical persecution by a private individual. The
use of this quotation is also inappropriate, and possibly misleading.
Not only did Wilson J. specifically refuse to make a pronouncement
on the full scope of section 7 rights in her decision in Singh186 but
Williams was not a refugee case. The applicant in Williams had
invoked section 7 in an attempt to stay an outstanding
deportation
187
order. This case is thus of no application to Noble.
An alternative approach by the Board would have been to recognize
that as a poor, aging, single woman the claimant would be even more
vulnerable to her assailant in the future. The serious abuse which she
had good reason to fear was a violation of her basic human right to
physical integrity and therefore constituted persecution. The claimant's
practice of moving from place to place to avoid her assailant and the
past and prospective ineffectiveness of the police established a reasonable possibility that the state could not protect the claimant She thus
had a well-founded fear of persecution and was unwilling or unable to
avail herself of the protection of her state and should therefore have
been recognized as a refugee.
REFUGEE DETERMINATION PROCEDURES
The process of refugee determination poses particular difficulties for
claimants who are assaulted women. 188 The nature of the proceedings
and the decision-makers' expectations regarding the production of
documentary evidence should be adapted to meet the needs of
assaulted women claimants.
185. [19851 2 (F.C.T.D.) .153.
186. Supra, note 108 at 460.
187. See note 110 above; Noble, supra note 13.
188. In recognition of the fact that women who have suffered persecution because
of their sex are often dealt with inappropriately through the refugee determination procedures of asylum countries, the November 1988 International Consultation on Refugee Women "called upon all States party to international and
regional instruments ... to develop standards and criteria for the adjudication
of asylum claims ... presented by refugee women": Kelly, supra, note 83 at 235236.
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The refugee determination procedure is a two-stage hearing process.
The first level or "credible basis" hearing was intended to screen out
claims that were manifestly unfounded. The original amendments to
the Immigration Act provided that the only evidence to be adduced at
these hearings was that related to the human rights record of the
claimant's country of origin and the disposition of refugee claims by
other nationals of that country. Upon the expression of concern from
a variety of sources1 89 that such an approach would result in the
unjusified denial of claimants from countries in which there had been
a significant change of circumstances, the amendment was modified
such that the inclusion of other evidence (such as the claimant's own
history) was permitted. 190 The hearing is adversarial in nature; a case
presenting officer can examine any evidence presented and question
any witnesses. If either the adjudicator or the Board member who
make up the panel for the credible basis hearing find there to be "any
credible or trustworthy evidence on which the Refugee Division might
determine the claimant to be a Convention refugee, the adjudicator or
member shall determine that the claimant has a credible basis for the
claim". 19 1 (emphasis added)
In Noor v. Minister of Employment and Immigration1 92 (hereinafter
Noor) the Quebec Superior Court considered the purpose for which the
credible basis hearing had been created and held that 'no credible
basis' meant that the claim lacked any evidentiary basis.193 The Federal Court of Appeal recently considered the Noor decision in Sheikh v.

189. It is worth noting that both the Y.W.C.A. and the National Action Committee
on the Status of Women submitted briefs to the government in which they proposed that the credible basis screen be dropped. Both organizations stated that
because of the relatively recent international consideration of women asylum
seekers it would be more likely that women would be screened out at this stage
because their claims would not fit the traditional (i.e. male-oriented) definition
of what constituted a refugee. See NA.C. Canadian Foreign Policy Committee,
Refugee Women and Bill C-55: Brief preparedfor Commons and Senate Committee
Hearings on Bill C-55, National Office (Ottawa), September 1987; Y.W.CA. of
Metropolitan Toronto, Brief on Bill C-55: Submitted to Senate Standing Committee on Legal and ConstitutionalAffairs, February 1988.
190. Immigration Act, supra, note 2, s. 46.01 (6).
191. Ibid.
192. (1989), 8 Imm. L.R.(2d) 134 (Q.S.C.)
193. Ibid. at 157.
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Minister of Employment and Immigration194 in which it concluded that,
for the words "credible and trustworthy" in Section 46.01(6) (quoted
above) to have any meaning, the first level panel should make its own
assessment of the credibility of the evidence before the panel. 195 The
Court cautioned that the concept of "credible evidence" is not the
same as the credibility of the claimant. 196 The Court went on to state,
however, that where the only evidence regarding the claim is the
claimant's testimony (with the possible addition of reports of general
conditions in the country of origin), a finding that the claimant is not
credible is, effectively, a finding that there is no credible basis to the
claim. 197 While the Court noted that the claimant must establish all
elements of the refugee definition at the credible basis hearing, the
decision is nonetheless clear that the threshold for the first level hearing is lower than that to be met at the full Board hearing.198
This new statement of the credible basis test imposes a higher standard on claimants at the first hearing than did Noor. An advocate
appearing at the credible basis hearing will have to provide information about wife assault to the case presenting officer and the panel in
order to give them a context within which to judge the claimant's cred-

194. (4 July 1990), Toronto A-521-89 (F.CA.D.) [unreported].
195. Ibid at 5.
196. Ibid.
197. Ibid. at 6. This decision appears to uphold Lee v. Minister of Employment and
Immigration (22 February 1990) Toronto A-401-89 (F.CA.D.) [unreported] while
limiting somewhat Sloley v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (22 February 1990) Toronto A-364-89 (F.CAD.) [unreported].
198. Ibid. This position is strengthened by the subsequent decision of the Federal
Court of Appeal in Leung v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (4 October
1990), Toronto A-480-89 (F.C.A.D.) [unreportedj in which the Court held that
the primary role of the panel at the credible basis hearing is to test the credibility of the evidence before it rather than to draw inferences or arrive at conclusions on the existence of the essential elements of the claim. The panel is to
consider whether or not there is sufficient evidence on the basis of which the
Refugee Division "might reasonably conclude" that the applicant is a Convention refugee [at page 21. The Court noted that the panel revealed its error in its
conclusions that there was no evidence on which the Refugee Division would
find the claimants to be refugees and that the proper test was whether or not
there was evidence on which the Refugee Division might so find [at pages2-3].
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ibility. As noted by Wilson J. in R v. Lavallee, expert evidence on the
subject of wife battering is essential for an appropriate evaluation of
the evidence in cases in which a woman's history of being battered is
central to the legal issues. 199 Without knowledge of wife assault, for
example, the panel may find the fact that the claimant stayed with her
husband for many years to be inconsistent with a history and fear of
persecution and therefore doubt her credibility. Because the nature of
the claim is somewhat unusual, advocates will likely need to make
more extensive submissions on the elements of the refugee definition
than would otherwise be necessary, particularly regarding the state
connection to persecution. Familiarity with caselaw relating to the subject and the ability to distinguish cases with a negative result 20 0 will
also be essential; the panel should be encouraged to find that the
claimant is credible and that there is at least "any" trustworthy evidence on which the Board could base a positive decision.
A Trinidadian woman who testified that she and her daughters had
been the victims of crimes such as rape, theft, break and enter and
threats was recently found to have a credible basis to her claim to
refugee status. The panel stated that the lack of state protection was

199. Supra, note 11 at 341-345.
200. In addition to the Noble (supra, note 13) and Williams (supra, note 185) cases

regarding violence against women, there is also Immigration and Refugee
Board Decision T89-00956/T89-00957, 5 July 1989.The claimant in that case
was a dual citizen of Colombia and Venezuela who feared returning to either
country as a result of the abuse she suffered at the hands of her then commonlaw partner, a member of a guerilla group. The claimant fled from the house
she shared with her assailant in Colombia to her aunt's home in Venezuela.
She learned that the man had tried to track her down through her grandmother in Colombia. He had beaten the grandmother, destroyed some of her
belongings and threatened her with death if she reported him to the police.

The claimant therefore left her aunt's home and hid until she was financially
able to leave the country. Rather than taking the "attributed political opinion"
approach used in Lazo-Majano (supra, note 172) the Board characterized the
case as "purely domestic"[at 6]. It failed entirely to consider the meaning of
"persecution" or whether or not the man's status as a guerilla had any implications to the issue of the state's ability or unwillingness to provide protection.
The Board also failed to examine the claimant's reasons that she would not be
safe in Venezuela.
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sufficient to establish the credible basis to the claim in terms of the
requirement of state connection. The panel stated:
"These acts of violence were tolerated by the authorities and if not
tolerated, then at least you were not protected adequately by the
authorities and that these acts of violence might have been committed against you because you are of... an East Indian background.
And also perhaps, because you are a woman who is unprotected in
Trinidad by a male or family members and this might2°1
be evidence
to suggest that you belong to a particular social group."
At the full Board hearing the proceedings are somewhat different in
that they are nominally non-adversarial. Section 69.1(5) of the Immigration Act provides that the claimant and her counsel are entitled to
present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and make representations
while the Minister of Employment and Immigration is limited to presenting evidence in all cases other than those involving the cessation
and exclusion clauses. The Act does not specifically mention the role
of the refugee hearing officer although his/her role is outlined in section 13 of the Convention Refugee DeterminationDivision Rules (hereinafter the Rules).
13. The Refugee Division may be assisted with a claim or application by a refugee hearing officer who may, subject to the direction of
the Refugee Division,
(a) file documentary evidence;
(b) call and question witnesses, and
(c) make oral and written submissions.Ola [emphasis added.]
The refugee hearing officer is supposed to be a neutral party2m who,
as suggested by section 13 of the Rules, assists the Board and is subject
to its direction. It appears that refugee hearing officers are actually
being given the message that a more adversarial approach to the full

201. Immigration File Number 9545-90-2301, last page of transcript, transcribed
March 7, 1990 (leave to appeal to the Federal Court of Canada granted). While
this hearing took place before the Sheikh supra. note 194 decision, the fact that
the panel found the claimant to be a credible witness means that the Sheikh
decision should not affect the meaning.
201a. SOR/88-1026.
202. S. Laredo, E. Pollock & J.Marshall, "The Evolution in Perception of the Role
of the RHO" (December 1989) 9:2 Refuge 4.
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Board hearings is acceptable. In an article about the role of the refugee hearing officer, members of the Immigration and Refugee Board
expressed their support for the cross-examination of claimants. 20 3
Candidates for the refugee hearing officers positions for which the
Board interviewed in the summer of 1990 were given an interview at
which their major task was to prepare and deliver a cross-examination
2 °4
and closing submissions from a transcript provided by the Board.
The acceptability of cross-examination being routinely taken on by the
refugee hearing officer is beyond the scope of this paper;,20 5 the point
is made only to alert advocates to the practice in order to enable them
to prepare their clients appropriately.
Advocates should also be aware of potential constraints on the
claimant's ability to tell her full story. In addition to feeling at least
uncomfortable and probably also guilty about revealing the intimate
details of her life, a woman may face more sinister limitations on her
testimony. In Kaur v. Minister of Employment and Immigration206 for
example, the applicant requested a reopening of her inquiry because
the presence of her son at her first inquiry, acting as her ex-husband's
"enforcer", had prevented her from speaking freely. The Board should
also be sensitive to the fact that women whose children are attached to
their claim may also be reticent to describe the details of their persecution in front of their children. Further, if the claimant's culture dictates
that she should suffer battering silently, the use of an interpreter from
her community may also intimidate her.
The need for evidence regarding the persecution faced by the claimant
and the state connection to the persecution through the failure of the
state to provide protection will be particularly crucial to refugee claims
based on wife assault. The difficulty, of course, is that not a great deal
of country-specific material is available through the traditional sources

203. Ibid.
204. Personal communication with interviewed candidate.
205. It is worth noting however that while the Act specifically gives claimants the
right to cross-examine witnesses, the Rules state merely that refugee hearing
officers may "call and question" witnesses. Not only are the refugee hearing
officers not given the specific power to cross-examine, but the wording could
suggest that the witnesses they are to question are the ones they call.
206. (1989), 10 Imm. L.R. (2d) I (F.CA.D.).
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of information for refugee claims. This is in large part because of the
failure of many states to consider violence against women to be a serious problem, or one worth an assignment of resources sufficient to
provide for the wide dissemination of research. Development organizations understandably tend to engage in direct service delivery rather
than extensive collection and wide distribution of data.20 7 It may
therefore be necessary for advocates to build their own pool of
resources through direct contacts with members of government departments, social services, and academia.20 8
The U.N.C.H.R. Handbook, recognizes that the circumstances of flight
make it difficult for a refugee claimant to provide proof of all of her
statements. It is also difficult for claimants to provide documentary
proof of a non-event, for example, that the police refused to respond to
their request for protection. Decision-makers should adopt this passage from the Handbook:
"While the burden of proof in principle rests on the applicant, the
duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts is shared
between the applicant and the examiner. Indeed, in some cases, it
may be for the examiner to use all the means at his [or her] disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support of the application. Even such independent research may not, however, always be
successful and there may also be statements that are not susceptible
of proof. In such cases, if the applicant's account appears credible,
he [or she] should, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be
given the benefit of the doub" 209
The Immigration and Refugee Board has the general power to "take
whatever measures are necessary to provide the parties with a full and
proper hearing".2 10 That this includes the provision of country-specific

207. MATCH International is a nongovernmental organization that funds womenspecific projects. Their funding priorities are to provide needed services, such
as shelters, rather than to do research to ascertain the extent of the need for
such services. (Personal communication with Tracy Heffernan of MATCH;

Ottawa, 25 April 1990.)
208. Sending copies of any material so obtained to the Immigration and Refugee
Board Documentation Centre and the I.R.B. Working Group on Refugee
Women would assist other advocates.
209. Supra, note 65 at paragraph 196.
210. Rules, supra, note 201a, s. 6.
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materials is supported by the Board's creation of a documentation centre open to the public. Given the difficulties of acquiring information
relevant to wife assault refugee claims, the Board's general power, and
the statement from the U.N.H.C.R. Handbook, the centre has a responsibility to collect information about the treatment of women in other
countries.
Where there is no country-specific information about wife assault
available, advocates should use general information about the nature
of wife battering to support, by extension, their client's claim. For
example, the literature on wife assault from many different countries
frequently makes reference to the inadequacy of police response. In
the absence of reliable material to the contrary (and this does not
include general information about police response which fails to deal
specifically with wife assault) the Board should accept the confirmation of inadequate state protection in the general literature as the best
21 1
evidence available next to the client's own sworn testimony.
The Federal Court of Appeal has, on a number of occasions, found
the Immigration Appeal Board's doubt of the credibility of a
claimant's uncontradicted sworn testimony to be invalid. 2 12 As stated
by the Court, "[wihen an applicant swears to the truth of certain allegations, this creates a presumption that those allegations are true
unless there be reason to doubt their truthfulness". 2 13 As noted by the
Federal Court of Appeal in the trilogy of cases of Ghanaian claimants
2 14
originally refused refugee status by the Immigration Appeal Board,
decisionmakers should not be over-vigilant in their examination of the

211. Another possibility would be to submit affidavits regarding wife assault in the
country of origin from people who are familiar with the issue. See Kassa v.
Minister of Employment and Immigration (1989), 105 N.R. 33 (F.CA.D.) at 34,
Mahoney JA which states that such evidence is "obviously highly relevant".
212. See Villaroel v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1979), 31 N.R. 50
(F.C.A.D.); Maldonado v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1979), [19801
2 F.C. 302 (F.C.A.D.) [unreported]; Ranjit Singh Thind v. Minister of Employment
and Immigration (27 November 1983), Toronto A-538-83 (F.CAD.) [unreported].
213. Maldonado, ibid. at 305.
214. Owusu-Ansah v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1989), 98 N.R. 312
(F.CA.D.); Frimpongv. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1989), 99 N.R.
164 (F.CAD.); Attakora v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1989), 99
N.R. 168 (F.CAD.).
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claimant's story. For example, the Court stated in Attakora v. Minister
of Employment and Immigration that, in the absence of medical evidence, it was not open to the Board to find that the claimant's knee
fracture made it impossible for him to walk when he had testified that
he had done so.2 15 Similarly, as noted above, decision-makers should
not conclude that a battered woman is not credible when she relates
that she was seriously injured on many occasions before she left.
Recently some Board members have been applying the case of Faryna
v. Chorny2 16 in their consideration of the claimant's testimony. A frequently quoted passage is:
"The credibility of interested witnesses, particularly in cases of conflict of evidence, cannot be gauged solely by the test of whether the
personal demeanour of the particular witness carried conviction of

the truth. The test must reasonably subject his story to an examination of its consistency with the probabilities that surround the currently existing conditions. In short, the real test of the truth of a
witness in such a case must be its harmony with the preponderance
of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would
readily
tions."217recognize as reasonable in that place and in those condiThis case should be applied with caution given that its facts are very
different from those of a refugee claim. Faryna v. Chorny was a libel
case decided in 1951, brought by a woman who had found a letter
from the defendant to the witness which implied that the woman was
unchaste, and possibly pregnant by the witness. The letter had been
written in Ukranian, the first language of the defendant and the witness. The issue was whether or not the witness understood the common Ukranian word for "confinement" as it applied to pregnant
women and whether or not he knew the woman to whom the letter
referred was the plaintiff. Clearly the facts of this case are very different from those of a refugee claim and the case should therefore be
applied with great restraint in refugee claims. While it may be reasonable for a judge to disbelieve testimony which seeks to establish that
the witness did not understand a letter written in his first language, its

215. Ibid. at 169.
216. (1951), 119521 2 D.L.R. 354 (B.C.C.A.).
217. Ibid. at 357.
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application in refugee claims may tempt Board members to measure
the credibility of the claimant by a cultural and socially-bound definition of what is reasonable, that is, in fact, unreasonable. 218 Board
members have reached unreasonable decisions such as those (noted
above) criticized by the Federal Court of Appeal for their faulty
assumptions of what constitutes reasonalbe behaviour.
Where the Faryna v. Chorny case may be useful, however, is in the
statement that the "probabilities" to which the testimony must be compared are to be reasonable in the appropriate context. In the case of
refugee claims based on wife assault this context, discussed at length
above, is one which recognizes the violence and cyclical nature of battering and the inadequacy of protection offered to battered women.
Decision-makers should not automatically discount testimony which
appears to conflict with written information about the country of origin. Where such a conflict arose on one occasion, the Immigration
Appeal Board gave "more weight to the applicant's version of the
racial situation in Guyana than to that described in the Country
Report coming as it does from someone [sic] who lived in Guyana as
part of a minority group". 219
Advocates can support their clients' testimony through documentation
such as reports from counsellors and doctors. If the abuse has affected
the claimant's memory, as in the case of a Parkdale Community Legal
Services' client whose husband repeatedly beat her on the head, a
medical report would be particularly useful. There may also be relatives or friends in Canada who would be able to testify as to the
nature of the persecution suffered by the claimant and whether or not
state protection was available to her.

218. For example, the common assumption that a person telling the truth will look
the questioner in the eye may not be true for people of a certain culture or
those who are embarassed to talk about the form their persecution took.
219. Ajodhia, supra, note 169 at 3, P. Davey.
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SUBMISSIONS
A one page summary outlining the argument to be made is a useful
guide to provide to the panel at the opening of the hearing of a refugee claim based on wife assault. Because such claims are somewhat
novel, an outline may help the panel to follow the presentation more
easily.
In the full submissions to the panel, advocates should first provide the
members with the necessary background about wife assault, then go
on to establish their client's experience and fear of persecution. The
violence and cyclical nature of wife assault must be brought home to
the Board as must the inadequacy of the state's response to this form
of persecution at the hands of other citizens. In reviewing the facts, it
may be useful to refer to Federal Court of Appeal jurisprudence
regarding the value of uncontradicted sworn testimony in immigration
hearings as well as the caselaw cautioning against drawing unsubstantiated inferences of lack of credibility because of the decision-makers'
overscrutiny of the claimant's testimony. Supporting affidavits from
relatives or others aware of the claimant's history and reports from
professionals can also be referred to, if available, to further support
the claim. Once the background on wife assault has been established
and the facts set out, the submissions should show the panel a way to
apply the refugee definition to the facts so as to arrive at a positive
decision.
The panel should be reminded of its obligation to ensure that the Act,
specifically the refugee definition, is interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with the equality guarantees in the Charter.Caselaw, the
U.N.H.C.R. Handbook, and international instruments should be
referred to in order to define "social group" and "persecution" in a
way that includes the claimant and her experience. One of the key
points in this regard is to show that her fear of persecution arises out
of her membership in a social group; the submissions must make this
connection clear.
Finally, the submissions must address the issue of the state's connection to the persecution. Country-specific information about allocation
of resources to fight wife assault and information about police
response to calls for protection for battered women will be helpful if
they are available. Otherwise it will be necessary to refer to the general
literature on the topic, note the pangeographic nature of wife assault,
and argue that this supports the claimant's testimony regarding the
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"reasonable possibility" that she will not be protected from persecution
if she returns to her country of origin. Submissions on the lack of state
protection should anticipate that the Ward decision will be used
against a claimant who did not actually go to the police for protection
or whose state is unable to provide protection. Advocates should distinguish Ward on the facts as much as possible and note that there is
precedent2 20 for decision-makers to accept the claimant's unwillingness to avail herself of state protection because of a reasonable belief
that the state would be ineffective.

LANDINGS ON HUMANITARIAN AND
COMPASSIONATE GROUNDS
GENERAL
Section 3(g) of the Immigration Act recognizes one of it's purposes as
the upholding of Canada's humanitarian tradition. This section provides potential relief for those people who do not fit the Convention
refugee definition as well as others who are inadmissible but whose
situations warrant special consideration. Section 114(2) of the Act gives
the Governor in Council authority to exempt anyone from the requirements of the Act or Regulations "for reasons of public policy" or for
"humanitarian and compassionate considerations".
Humanitarian and compassionate landings arise in a number of circumstances. The exemption from the Regulations may be to allow an
otherwise admissible person to make an application from within Canada, rather than from a visa office abroad as required by section 9(1)
of the Act. A further exemption may also be requested to allow a person who does not meet the admission criteria to be landed anyway.
The authority to exempt an applicant from the Act or Regulations and to
facilitate their landing is a discretionary power, and therefore not subject
to mandamus. However, there is a duty to consider every application,
which may be enforced by way of declaration.2 2 1 Further, the exercise of
the discretion must accord with principles of administrative law. It must
be exercised fairly, with full consideration of all relevant factors, and
220. Salibian, supra, note 93; Rajudeen, supra, note 116; Ajodhia, ibid.; I.R.B. Decision
T89-03176, supra note 170.
221.

irminez-Perez v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [19841 2 S.C.R- 565.
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without taking irrelevant factors into account Of particular concern in
the immigration law context is the fettering of discretion.
In practice, an immigration officer assesses an applicant's application
and makes a recommendation. If the recommendation is positive, the
Federal Court has said that it may not be overturned by a senior officer unless the applicant has had an opportunity to make further submissions.2 22 If the applicant is given a negative recommendation,
further submissions may be made to the area office manager with a
request for reconsideration. Judicial review is available but limited to
errors in the use of discretion and fairness.m The applicant may not
be allowed to remain in Canada while the application for reconsideration is being processed or the judicial review is adjudicated. 224
The words "humanitarian" and "compassionate" are not defined anywhere in the Act or Regulations, and therefore must be given their ordinary meaning.2M The Commission developed a number of policies, or
case categories with a checklist of criteria for each, to be used by
immigration officers in the exercise of their discretion. 22 6 These were
contained in Chapter 9 of the Immigration Manual: Examination and
Enforcement (IE 9). The types of cases covered in the policy guidelines
were: 227
1) inadmissibility on security grounds,
2) spousal sponsorship from within Canada,

222. Johl v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (14 October 1987), Doc. No. T.
837-87 (F.C.T.D.) [unreported], as summarized in F. Marrocco & H. Goslett,
The Annotated Immigration Act of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 318.
223. J.M. Evans, et al., AdministrativeLaw (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1984), c.
12; "lilt
is not up to this Court to review the merits by way of examining the
evidence but merely to consider whether the applicants were treated with
administrative fairness and to determine whether there existed any bias, bad
faith, lack of jurisdiction or error of law on the part of the official concerned":
Lowe v. Canada (1987) 4 Imm.LR.(2d) 85 at 88-89.
224. Prassad v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, 119891 1 S.C.R. 560. 57
D.LR. (4th) 663; Williams, supra, note 185.

225. C.L. Rotenberg, "Humanitarian and Compassionate" (1989) 8 Imm.L.R. 295.
226. For a discussion of how these are used, see Rotenberg, ibid. at 296.
227. Supra, note 2, IE 9.16-9.31.
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3) situations of family dependancy,
4) illegal de facto residents,
5) those on employment authorizations with a long term commitment to Canada,
6) public policy (cultural, scientific, social contribution to Canada,
and business people who would provide jobs for Canadians),
7) situations involving marriage breakdown and sponsorship withdrawal,
8) and the foreign domestic program.
THE REFUGEE DETERMINATION SYSTEM
The current refugee determination system and the Backlog regulations2 provide that a humanitarian and compassionate review will be
held before the credible basis hearing. A second one is scheduled if
the claimant fails to meet the credible basis test or is determined not
to be a Convention refugee at the final hearing.
Prior to the Federal Court decision in Yhap v. Minister of Employment
2 9 (hereinafter Yhap) the first humanitarian and comand ImmigrationP
passionate review was limited to a consideration of factors which came
to be known as 'ballet dancers and family class'. 3 0 If neither applied,
the investigation stopped and a negative recommendation was given.
In Yhap, the court held that the limitation of the consideration to these
two factors unfairly fettered the immigration officers' discretion so as
to constitute a jurisdictional error. Although guidelines and "rough

228. B.A. Dougall, Manager, Backlog Clearance Task Force, Draft Backlog Procedures, Memorandum to Regional Backlog Coordinators, June 6, 1989 at 4.
229. (1990) 9 Imm L.R. (2d) 242 (F.C.T.D.).
230. The officers were to investigate whether or not the claimant's return to the.
country of origin would so embarrass that country's government that they
could be expected to punish the claimant, that is, was the claimant a member
of an official delegation or a famous ballet star? Further, they were to consider
whether or not the claimant was in a position to be sponsored as a member of
the family class, and had a sponsor willing to assume financial responsibility
for him or her.

Assaulted Migrant Women's Claims to Refugee Status

rules of thumb" could be used to assist officers in the exercise of their

discretion, the guidelines as stated were rigid and inflexible.231

Following Yhap, the Minister hastily cancelled the previous guidelines,
as well as all of Chapter 9. New guidelines were substituted, much
broader than the original Backlog guidelines. 232 The new guidelines

affirm that:
"Humanitarian and compassionate grounds exist when unusual,
undeserved or disproportionate hardship would be caused to a person seeking consideration. A humanitarian and compassionate
review is a case by case response whereby officers are expected to
consider carefully all aspects of a situation use their best judgment
and make an informed recommendation."233

The new guidelines also set out a series of case categories under which
to make the assessments. 234 These are essentially the same as the previous ones, with three exceptions. There are no guidelines which cover
situations of inadmissibility on security grounds. Marriage breakdown
cases are also not considered. The third difference is the addition of a
"severe sancguideline specifically directed at refugee-like situations:
' 23 4
a
tions or inhumane treatment in country of origin.
This guideline is of particular interest to assaulted women who have
sought refuge in Canada. The relevant parts are:
"Consideration should be given where there exists a special situation in the person's home country, and undue hardship would

likely result from removal... Others may warrant consideration

231. Yhap, supra, note 229 at 261. The Court approved the guidelines in Chapter 9.
232. Practically, there appears to be little difference in the interpretation of the
new or old guidelines for refugee claimants: cases which appear to obviously
meet the new criteria are still receiving negative recommendations.
233. Guidelines for Immigration Officers on the Exercise of Discretion, Prepared Pursuant
to the Judgment Rendered by Justice Jerome in the Case of Ken Yung Yhap,
attached to T.B. Sheehan, Memorandum on the Exercise of Discretion-H &
C, to Directors of Immigration, March 20, 1990 at 2.
234. Ibid. at 3-5. It should be noted that, as of the date of writing this, these guidelines are contained only in an Operations Memorandum, not in the Policy and
Procedures Manual. A final version of these can be expected sometime in the
future.
234a. Abid.

(1990) 6Journalof Law and Social Policy
because of their personal circumstances in relation to current laws
and practices in their country of origin. Such persons could reasonably expect unduly harsh or inhumane treatment in their country
should they be removed. In these cases there should be strong reasons to believe that the person will face a life threatening situation
in his or her homeland as a direct result of the political or social
situation in that country. Such situations are more likely to occur in
countries with repressive governments or those experiencing civil
strife or war.
The onus is on the applicants to satisfy officers that a) a particular
situation exists in in their country and that, b) their personalcircuin235
stances in relation to that situation warrant positive discretion."
The inclusion of "social situation" is promising for assaulted women
who have sought refuge in Canada, as it potentially includes a consideration of gender-specific social situations.23 6 However, the direction
that situations will most likely arise when there is a repressive government, civil war or strife obviates the consideration that a government
may be democratic; yet, still not provide women with protection
against wife assault. The requirement that the expected treatment be
"unduly harsh or inhumane" may be interpreted to mean harsh in
relation to other women in her situation: if many women can expect to
that she will also
be beaten in the home country, then the23expectation
7
harsh".
"unduly
seem
not
may
be beaten
Further, the requirement that it be a demonstrable "life threatening
situation" may be difficult to meet. If the woman has survived the
assaults so far, there may be a presumption that it is not actually "life
threatening". Evidence as to the escalation of violence and spousal

235. Ibid. at 3-4.
236. The wording of the second sentence quoted above from this guideline bears a
strong resemblance to Executive Committee Conclusion No. 39, supra note 59.
It can be argued that assaulted women who take active steps to stop the abuse
are transgressing the social mores of their society, and that the guideline,
because of the similarity to the Conclusion, should be interpreted to include
these women.
237. Immigration officers, for example, when interviewing Sri Lankans, appear to
apply a 'compared to other Sri Lankans' test when told that the applicant fears
bombing if returned to the homeland (Parkdale Community Legal Services'
caseworker's report on interview).
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homicide may be necessary unless there is clear evidence of attempted
murder in the past.
The onus is on the applicant to "satisfy the officer" that a particular
situation exists in her country, and further, that her personal circumstances warrant consideration. As discussed above, data on wife
assault and lack of protection for women is still very difficult to
obtain. Further, if the officer is ignorant of or trivializes wife assault, it
may be very difficult to satisfy him or her that it is life threatening, or
relates to political or social conditions in that country.
Despite the difficulties with the guidelines, there are ways to use them.
More and more evidence of wife assault in other countries, or the
treatment of women in the family, is becoming available. In addition,
in Toronto in particular, there are women from other countries who
possess the necessary expertise to provide confirmation of the
applicant's statements regarding the condition of women. Further, sub38
missions should assume that officers are ignorant of wife assault,
and contain a brief discussion of the issue so that they may make an
informed decision.
The requirement that the applicant "should" face a life threatening situation is effectively mandatory. Although caselaw has interpreted
"should" to mean "may", thus making judicial review on this issue difficult, our experience at Parkdale Community Legal Services is that
immigration officers routinely interpret this type of language as mandatory. Thus, an applicant who satisfied an officer that she faced forcible confimement and physical abuse, but not death, would not be
assessed positively under the guideline. Submissions should address
this issue directly.2 39

238. Immigration officers currently receive no training in wife assault: R. Cooke,
Sponsorship Withdrawal for Battered Immigrant Women, (Parkdale Community Legal Services Intensive Programme in Poverty Law, May 1989) [unpublished].
239. Judicial review would still be available if there were a number of cases which
could be brought together, as was done for Yhap, supra, note 229, to show that
immigration officers were fettering their discretion in fact.

(1990) 6 Journalof Law and Social Policy

SPONSORSHIP WITHDRAWAL
Humanitarian and compassionate review is also important to abused
women who have been sponsored by their husbands. Over 50% of
women immigrants are here as members of the family class, most
sponsored by their husbands. 240 Most of these women obtain immigrant visas abroad and obtain their permanent resident status when
they arrive in Canada. If they are then abused and choose to leave
their spouses, they may do so without being subject to possible deportation. 24 1 The main problem working with this group, especially those
who do not speak fluent English, is apprising them of their rights.
They have usually been told by their husbands that, if they leave or
even call the police, he will have them deported. He may also tell
them they have no rights to children, property, welfare, etc. These
problems, however, are usually approached through public legal education and working with shelters and women's community groups.
Women who arrive in Canada without permanent resident status and
then are sponsored while remaining in Canada are a much more vulnerable group. They are almost always granted an exemption from the
requirement that they apply abroad on humanitarian and compassionate grounds upon proof that the marriage is genuine and not just for
immigration purposes. They are also automatically eligible for permanent resident status as a member of the family class, provided they are
admissible on medical and security grounds. However, processing of
the application for an Order in Council allowing them to become
landed from within Canada and the completion of the paperwork
takes at least a year, and often up to two years. During this period, if
they leave their husbands, they are potentially subject to deportation.
As noted above, this threat is often used as part of the abuse, and to
keep the woman from leaving or calling the police.

240. S. Seward & K. McDade, "Immigrant Women in Canada: a Policy
Perspective". A Background Paper prepared for Canadian Advisory Council
on the Status of Women (Ottawa: CACSW, 1988) at 6.
241. They may have problems obtaining social assistance however, because of the
sponsorship agreement They will be required to have a form signed by Immigration that the sponsorship has been withdrawn. Welfare's current policy is
that if there is evidence of abuse, an emergency cheque may be issued before
the form is signed.
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The immigration office will discover the marriage breakdown either
through her contact with them, or through the husband contacting
immigration to withdraw sponsorship. Subsequently, both of them will
be called in for an interview separately, to tell their side of the story.
In Parkdale's experience, the husband usually tells the immigration
officer any or all of the following: she married him for immigration
purposes, she is having affairs, she was a spy in her home country, she
was married back home and therefore the whole application was
invalid, and so on. These are not fatal, but the officer will want at least
an affidavit from the woman denying the more serious allegations.
The woman may not be aware of these allegations until the interview;
accompanying the client to the interview is therefore imperative.24 2
Until the Yhap decision, there was a special policy in the humanitarian and compassionate guidelines set out in IE 9 to cover the situation
of marriage breakdown. The new guidelines issued by the Minister following Yhap have omitted these guidelines.2 4 3 In our view, this should
be rectified, as sponsorship withdrawal on marriage breakdown is a
special situation, and applicants merit consideration on grounds which
reflect their experience.
Assuming this omission was not intentional, immigration lawyers are
continuing to make submissions in these cases based on the old guidelines. 243a Since they are no longer in operation, the old guidelines do
not need to be strictly adhered to or met, as decisions must be made
on a case by case basis. However, it is likely that they still carry some
weight, and therefore are offered as guidance for submissions.

242. Because immigration interviews are not part of the traditional litigation model,
lawyers often do not see the need for representation at them and, being timeconstrained, let the client go alone. Interviews should be seen as the first step
in the litigation process which, if properly handled, can save lawyers and their
clients time in the long run. In our experience, representation may avert inappropriate questions, and also guides the legal worker in preparing further submissions when necessary to meet the Officer's concerns.
243. Immigration Manual,supra, note 2.
243a. Mary Marrone, Immigration staff lawyer at Community and Legal Aid Services Programme, Osgoode Hall Law School, formerly in private practice.
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The old guidelines directed an officer to stop processing a woman's
application upon being apprised of a withdrawal of sponsorship prior
to landing, and to begin removal proceedings.244 In Dawson v. Minister
of Employment and Immigration,2 45 it was determined that the time of
landing was when the Order in Council was issued. If the applicant
was eligible for landing as a member of the family class at the time
the Order in Council was issued, that is, if sponsorship had not yet
been withdrawn, then she must be processed for landing. The old
Immigration Manual did not reflect the decision in Dawson, but continued to assume that an application for landing did not take effect until
a further assessment had been made, some time after the Order in
Council had been received. This is clearly wrong in law.24 6
If the Order in Council has not yet been granted, then submissions
must be made as to why she should be landed despite the withdrawal.
If submissions regarding life threatening situation can be made, these
should be included. 247 Otherwise, the officer may look at her establishment potential and any humanitarian and compassionate factors.
Although the landing application is based on humanitarian and compassionate factors, the first thing the officers were directed to under
the old guidelines contained in IE 9.31 was establishment potential.
This was directed at ensuring that the woman and any dependent children would not become public charges, rendering her potentially inad-

244. Immigration Manual, supra, note 2, IE 9.31.
245. (1988) 6 Imm. L.R. 27 (F.C.T.D.). Teitelbaum J. said at 50: "If I accepted [the
Minister's] submission, any sponsored applicant would be compelled to act in
a way dictated by the sponsor for fear that the sponsorship would be withdrawn." Although in that case the Immigration Officer had written "meets all
other requirements" on the file, Teitelbaum 3. anticipates the case where no
such statement appears: "Surely before [the date when the application for
exemption was sent in)the Minister's representative must have completed...
his examination of Dawson's file to see if Dawson had all the necessary criteria to become a permanent resident in accordance with his application" (at

50-51).
246. Orders in Council are published in the Canada Gazette, and often take several
months to reach the applicant's file at Immigration.
247. This has arisen when the husband for some reason is returning to the home
country, or when, as a result of the marriage breakdown, she will be considered to have transgressed social mores in the home country so that returning
as a divorced woman would itself be life threatening.
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missible under section 19(l)(b) of the Act. 248 Immigration looked at
economic factors such as the independent selection criteria, her previous training, education and employment history, and whether or not
there was a relative willing and able to assist. They also looked at the
composition of sponsorable family members here and abroad. 249 The
last factor in this section was whether or not they were de facto residents of Canada, i.e. were their ties with Canada, had they severed ties
with the home country, and were they well-integrated into Canadian
society.
These criteria were systemically discriminatory, especially against
women in abusive relationships. Many women who come here do not
obtain work permits, even though they may be eligible, often because
their husband has not wanted them to work, or because they felt it
unnecessary as they intended to stay at home to care for their children. When the marriage breaks down, and they attempt to obtain a
work permit they are often denied. 250 Thus, they cannot show their
ability to establish themselves. Where possible, women may rely on
their work history in their home country, however many of our clients
come from countries where women either do not usually do waged
work, or are ghettoized in low-paying, low-skill jobs. We encourage clients in these situations to begin upgrading courses or join sole-support
mothers' programs through social assistance at the earliest possible
opportunity. Lack of child care often makes the job almost impossible,
but, while sensitivity to her situation is essential, she must be fully
apprised of the consequences of not pursuing waged employment or
upgrading.

248. If this is used as a threshhold question, the decision may be subject to judicial
review on the grounds that the Immigration Officer failed to consider all the
relevant factors.
249. Note that no attention was given to whether or not the woman intends to bring
these family members here, or whether they want to come.
250. If they are on a Minister's Permit, they are eligible to apply for an employment authorization (s.20(4)(e) of the Regulations), supra. note 2, though they
are subject to the "Canadians First" policy (s.20(l)): they need a validated
job offer. The mere fact that Immigration intends to make a negative recommendation is not enough to deny an employment authorization: likelihood
of having to obtain social assistance is one factor which must be considered:
Mitchell v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (15 July 1983), Doc. No.
T-1563-83 (F.C.T.D.) [unreported] summarized in Marrocco,supra, note 222 at
326.
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The "de facto resident" requirement may also be difficult to establish
in wife abuse cases, because of the isolation which is often part of the
abuse. For immigrant women, isolation is often particularly easy to
effect, as the husband uses his longer residence in Canada to prove
that he knows Canadian society: one client was told by her husband
that she should not speak to anyone, or go out alone, or she would be
mugged and raped on the streets. A language barrier may also contribute to isolation.
The client may thus have great difficulty showing that she is integrated
into Canadian society. A lack of knowledge of the dominant official
language in the area in which she lives will also work against a positive recommendation. Sponsored immigrants are not eligible for government-subsidized language programs,2 1 and thus have to add the
job of taking language programs to their other family duties of housework, childcare and often waged work. Even if she decides to make
this effort, her husband may actively discourage her from so doing in
an attempt to keep her isolated.
Aside from encouragement and facilitation of the client's attempts to
meet the establishment criteria, submissions should also include a discussion of why the client has not been able to meet these criteria as of
the interview date, based on the above arguments and others as relevant Any efforts she has been able to make or is planning to make in
the future should be detailed, with as many supporting documents as
possible. While the application may not be accepted, it may be possible to obtain a Minister's Permit and/or a work permit to give her time
to show establishment potential. Reference to her resourcefulness, past
or present, in any area of her life may also help. A court support order
will also assist in her showing her ability to be independent.
The second set of criteria the officer looked at under the former guidelines were humanitarian and compassionate factors. The first humanitarian and compassionate factors considered in marriage breakdown
cases related to fraud. The officer must first be satisfied that the marriage itself was genuine, and not merely for immigration purposes.

251. Seward & McDade, supra, note 240 at 19-21. Where there is a large ethnic population, we have argued that there has been insufficient opportunity to learn
English, and that the client is integrated into an ethnic community which
forms a part of Canadian multicultural society.
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Arguably, this point is determined at the initial marriage and sponsorship interviews, and should not be open to further investigation without new and compelling evidence. 25 2 The assertions of an angry
husband should not be considered sufficient grounds to reopen the
investigation without further evidence.
The second area of potential fraud was whether or not the client acted
in bad faith, that is, did she come to the attention of Canada Immigration through someone else's report, or did she report voluntarily? The
woman is under a duty to inform the immigration office of a change
in her circumstances as soon as possible after she has left her husband. Otherwise, she may be seen as guilty of misrepresentation. This
is an onerous requirement for the following reasons. First, the longer
she waits, the greater the probability that her application for landing
will be processed to completion. Second, she may not know whether
the separation is permanent or whether she will return to him. Third,
she may not be able to face the immigration bureaucracy at a time
when her life situation is so uncertain and she herself is traumatized.
A report from a shelter worker or the leader of a group whom she has
worked with may be of assistance to support submissions on this.
The third criterion was whether or not the applicant suffered physical
and mental abuse, including threats of sponsorship withdrawal. Officers often ask for independent documentation of the abuse: police
reports and medical evidence. If the woman has no supporting evidence, submissions should give reasons for this as well as explain why
she should not be expected to have any (fear of calling the police and
why, injuries not serious enough for hospitalization or the use of
home remedies, etc.).
Under the old guidelines, it was stated that abuse "should not itself be
a reason for landing someone". One of the reasons given for not
allowing abuse to be determinative was that the applicant may be better off in her home country where her family can give her support
This should be addressed in submissions regarding her expected treatment by her family, the treatment of divorced women in her home

252. In Sivicilar v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1984), 57 N.R. 57
(F.C.A.), the Court held that Immigration could not reopen an inquiry regarding working without authorization following sponsorship withdrawal.
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country, and the lack of support she will face. Another criterion in the
guidelines addressed this latter explicitly, by asking whether resettlement assistance was available in the home country.
Two other factors considered were whether the applicant is pregnant,
and whether she had any Canadian-born children. Pregnancy may
delay removal, but Immigration's attitude has been that the presence
of Canadian-born children is almost immaterial. 253 Their position is
that the Canadian child may stay in Canada, albeit without his or her
mother, or that the child may go with the mother and then return to
Canada at a later date and sponsor his or her mother then. We usually
stress the detrimental effects on the child's future in Canada if educated in a non-Canadian educational system, as well as the trauma to
the child of separation from the mother. A custody order can be helpful in this argument
The final criterion was whether or not returning to the home country
to apply for landing would be a matter of "mere inconvenience": economic and educational disruption must be severe to warrant consideration. This criterion again was discriminatory: middle class people are
more likely to be able to prove educational and career disruption than
lower income people. A final argument may be based on the "public
policy" factor in section 114(2) of the Act. The new guidelines state that
public policy exceptions are those which Immigration determines are
in the national interest. There is no authority for this assertion, as
surely the determination of what is public policy goes beyond
Immigration's purview. An officer is therefore not bound to consider
only those public policies set out in the guidelines. Canada has made
many initiatives to combat wife assault in the last twenty years, and it
2 4
thus can be said that combatting wife assault is a public policy. 5
Having stringent criteria which women in marriage breakdown situations must meet in order to be landed encourages women to 2stay
in
5
abusive situations and thus is directly contrary to public policy. 5

253. This position is potentially challengeable in Court, using arguments based on
the rights of a Canadian citizen.
254. See for example those initiatives described in Convention for the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Second Report of Canada (Ottawa:
Department of the Secretary of State of Canada, January 1989).
255. We estimate that 1/2 the women we work with in these situations return to
their abusive partners to await their Records of Landing.
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The interview following notification of the marriage breakdown may
not take place for a number of months. We begin the advocacy early,
by ensuring that the client understands what will be expected of her.
We assist her to meet these criteria by contacting community agencies
or other sources of support. We also try to ensure that Immigration is
aware of her new address, or at least that she will receive any call-in
notices they may send her. Estranged husbands often tell their wives
that they will not withdraw sponsorship, and then do so immediately.
They also often tell her they will give her any letters she receives from
Immigration, and then don't. She must be fully aware of the possible
consequences of not informing Immigration immediately of her
change in circumstances.
SUBMISSIONS
In practice, landings on humanitarian and compassionate are an easier route to landing than refugee claims have been to date. It is also
potentially faster than the refugee determination system. It is therefore
critical that submissions for landing on humanitarian and compassionate grounds be carefully prepared, and that the client be represented at the interviews, both in the refugee stream and in sponsorship
withdrawal cases.
In preparing submissions, we have found it useful to put in as much
detail as necessary to make the client's story real to the officer. Merely
putting down dates or brief details seldom leads the officer to form a
sympathetic opinion for several reasons. Most people seem to have a
reluctance to investigate the personal and often degrading circumstances of a woman's life. This may be due to natural respect for privacy, or to a desire to remain ignorant of horrific details because of a
sense of helplessness. However, without a sense of the terror of the
individual experience of wife assault, the officer may view the case
abstractly, without having his or her emotions engaged. Even if flat
submissions may be redressed in part by the client telling her story at
the interview, the officer's supervisor will have only the written submissions and officer's notes on which to base a recommendation.
Second, a brief discussion of the issue of wife assault is necessary to
educate the officer and contextualize the case. What should be
included in this section will be informed by the facts of each case. For
example, if the client did not call the police, then a discussion of why
some women don't call the police should be included. If she was
abused in the home country, but still came to Canada to join her hus-
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band at a later date, then a discussion of the cycle of violence is
appropriate to rebut assumptions that she only rejoined him in Canada for immigration purposes. Information on country conditions
regarding the position of women in society and if possible, protection
and support for abused women and the treatment of separated or
divorced women, should be included in submissions for women in refugee situations. As noted earlier, Executive Committee Conclusion No.
39 may be used to lend strength to the argument that the client should
be favourably
considered, even if she cannot prove a life threatening
6
situation.2
Finally, submissions based on the old guidelines should be included,
particularly those relating to establishment potential. Equality arguments based on the systemic discrimination inherent within the establishment potential criteria may usefully be made, especially to provide
a context for submissions on the attempts the client has made to meet
them, and future plans. For example, submissions may be made on
her resourcefulness and motivation to become self-supporting, given
the hurdles which she has to overcome. Without those or similar submissions, however, equality arguments are not likely to win, given the
strong mandate of the Immigration Act to exclude those who are likely
to become a public charge.
STRATEGIES FOR REFORM
Our work with assaulted migrant women developed out of Parkdale
Community Legal Services' ongoing work with and on behalf of
assaulted women in general. From outreach and public education with
community groups and shelters, we learned that assaulted migrant
women faced particular problems requiring particular solutions. This
paper has concentrated on possible legal solutions for two categories
of migrant women: women fleeing persecution and those whose sponsorship has been withdrawn. There is further work to be done in this

256. Supra, note 59.
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area. In addition, the problems of women
who do not fit into these
7
categories still need to be addressed.2
Clearly, a solution to these problems cannot be achieved by legal
action alone. The laws and policies and their interpretation have not
recognized the reality of women's experience, and this imbalance must
be addressed through other means. What follows is an outline of some
of the initiatives to date.
Intra-clinic education: Assaulted women often come into our clinic
for assistance with matters other than wife assault. Accordingly, we
place great importance on developing the sensitivity to recognize
such situations
in all our workers, to allow us to offer appropriate
25 8
assistance.
Public legal education: We have targeted community groups and English
Second Language classes attended by migrant women for our outreach
and public legal education program. Many of our clients come to us as a
result of discussions with these groups about immigration, family law and
wife assault. We have also given training sessions to crisis line and shelter
workers, and community college students training to work with assaulted
women and children. People who work in this area need to be informed
of the legal consequences to migrant women of their work.259 They are
also an important source of referrals.
257. For example, discussions with Sophie Nbaio-Yeboah of the Canadian African Newcomers Aid Centre of Toronto reveal that there is a significant
problem arising out of Canadian visa offices' refusal to recognize most traditional African marriages. Women in this situation must be sponsored as
fiancees by their husbands, and are granted admission on the condition that
they 'marry' their husbands within 90 days of their arrival. If they are
rejected by their husbands within this period, or leave because of abuse, they
have failed to meet the conditions of their visa and are subject to deportation. Rejection may be related to the long separation of spouses caused by
current Immigration practices.
258. For example, a woman may approach us with what she characterizes as a
landlord and tenant problem. Further investigation may reveal that she is
being evicted because of the actions of an abusive husband.
259. For example, shelter workers may believe they have an obligation to report a
resident to Immigration. In fact, they have no such obligation, and are often
under a duty of confidentiality which precludes such action. Another danger
is shelter workers' advising clients on how to proceed with Immigration
without obtaining legal advice, thus potentially complicating the client's situation.
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Given the importance of understanding wife assault to ensure an
appropriate determination of assaulted women's cases, we hope to pursue training sessions for immigration officers.
Support groups: At the initiative of one of our community legal workers, a support group of Spanish-speaking women has formed. "Women
of Courage"2 60 meets regularly to provide its members with mutual
support and entertainment Support groups for women of other ethnic
and linguistic communities are in the process of forming.
Law reform on sponsorship withdrawal: We are participating in a lobbying effort against the systemic discrimination inherent in the
establishment potential criteria for landings on humanitarian and
compassionate grounds. It is our position that women whose sponsorship has been withdrawn should be given Minister's Permits,
including employment authorizations, for a period of up to three
years. This would allow women to upgrade their skills and/or
obtain employment to meet the establishment criteria, in recognition that, given the circumstances of their lives, this may take some
time.2 61 This strategy was initiated by Jacqueline Greatbatch, staff
lawyer at Parkdale Community Legal Services in submissions to the
Minister of Employment and Immigration. To date, this has only
produced a response from the Minister expressing sympathy but no
commitment to change. In conjunction with a group of community
workers, we are gathering information and will be making further
submissions in the near future.
Research: A key element in the representation of assaulted migrant
women is acquiring information about gender-specific country conditions. This takes several forms. We include gender-specific materials in

260. The Spanish translation of "courage" includes the concept of outrage.
261. While this does not address the systemic discrimination of the criteria themselves, we believe that anything more far-reaching will be politically impossible to achieve at this time. Giving clients a work permit and time to show
establishment would meet the needs of many of our clients. Alternatively,
any new guidelines issued by the Minister with regard to criteria for landing
in sponsorship withdrawal cases should reflect the difficulties abused
women have in showing establishment potential, and redress the systemic
discrimination inherent in the criteria discussed in this paper and elsewhere.
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our country profile files, and are developing our awareness of currently available resources. Because so little is available in Canada, we
have begun to contact agencies in other countries for information they
may be able to provide. One response we received suggested the possibility of a research project to be funded by a development agency. We
hope to pursue this in the future. Finally, we should not forget that,
particularly in the case of refugee claimants, Immmigration has an
obligation to provide information about gender-specific persecution.
Advocates should not hesitate to request such information from the
Immigration and Refugee Board Documentation Centre and from refugee hearings officers.
At Parkdale Community Legal Services, we have met many women
whose horrific stories of violence at the hands of their husbands and
boyfriends have moved and inspired us to seek protection for them by
making it possible for them to remain in Canada. In the course of our
efforts it has been made clear to us that the playing field of international protection is anything but level. That can be changed. Change
will come through long term strategies for reform. It will also come
through advocates refining the arguments in this paper, developing
and sharing new arguments, and making these arguments on behalf of
our clients despite the difficulties. Advocates must show immigration
officers and members of the Immigration and Refugee Board ways to
apply law and policy so as to make international protection available
to assaulted migrant women. These women deserve protection from
violence. They deserve to live in a place where they can feel and be
safe. They deserve a home.

